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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON MARKET DISCIPLINE IN EMERGING MARKETS
Ays¸e Ece Ungan
A Ph. D. Dissertation
Supervisor: Assistant Professor Dr. Selc¸uk Caner
Co-Supervisor: Associate Professor Su¨heyla O¨zyıldırım
December 2007
In the aftermath of major crises, most emerging markets improved their bank-
ing industries according to Basel-II requirements, which emphasize the role of
market discipline, supervision and capital adequacy in controlling risk-taking by
banks. After the 1998 crisis in the Russian Federation and the 2001 crisis in
Turkey, Central Bank of Russia and Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency
of Turkey restructured and consolidated the banking industries in both of the coun-
tries. In the restructured banking environment, market discipline could be used as
a complementary mechanism for improved supervision of banking systems. First
two essays of this thesis elaborate on depositor discipline in the Russian Federation
and Turkey. Findings provide evidence that in the Russian Federation, depositors
allocate funds in well-capitalized and liquid banks. Similarly after the crisis, de-
positors in Turkey prefer well-capitalized banks that have favorable asset quality.
Although banks in Turkey operate more efficiently, due to excessive guarantees,
depositors do not monitor banks’ risk taking behavior particularly before restruc-
turing. In the third essay, the role of different types of shareholders in disciplining
listed banks in Turkey is studied. While diversified shareholders are interested in
profitability, owner-managers are concerned with capital adequacy, liquidity and
efficiency of the banks. In addition, owner-managers are found to have some influ-
ence on bank management to reduce risk-taking. In particular, small banks take
measures to increase the capital ratio while decreasing non-performing loans as a
result of an increase in shareholders’ asset risk assessments.
Keywords: Banking, market discipline, depositor discipline, equityholder dis-
cipline, emerging markets, stock prices, Russian Federation, Turkey.
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O¨ZET
YU¨KSELEN PI˙YASALARDAKI˙ PAZAR DI˙SI˙PLI˙NI˙ U¨ZERI˙NE MAKALELER
Ays¸e Ece Ungan
Doktora Tezi
Tez Yo¨neticisi: Yardımcı Doc¸. Dr. Selc¸uk Caner
Ortak Tez Yo¨neticisi: Doc¸. Dr. Su¨heyla O¨zyıldırım
Aralık 2007
Ekonomik krizler sonrasında yu¨kselmekte olan piyasaların bankacılık sekto¨rle-
ri, banka risklerinin risk yo¨netim sistemleri, denetim ve pazar disiplini ile kontrol
altına alınmasını o¨ngo¨ren Basel-II Uzlas¸ısı’nın gereklerine go¨re du¨zenlenmis¸tir.
Rusya Federasyonu’nda 1998 yılında, Tu¨rkiye’de ise 2001 yılında yas¸anan krizler-
den sonra, Rusya Merkez Bankası ve Bankacılık Du¨zenleme ve Denetleme Ku-
rumu (BDDK) tarafından Rusya ve Tu¨rkiye’deki bankacılık sekto¨rleri sag˘lam ve
gu¨venilir bic¸imde c¸alıs¸mak u¨zere yeniden yapılandırılmıs¸tır. Bu kos¸ullar altında
pazar disiplini her iki u¨lkede de banka denetiminin tamamlayıcı unsuru olarak kul-
lanılabilir. Bu tezin ilk iki makalesinde, Rusya ve Tu¨rkiye’deki mudilerin bankalar
u¨zerindeki disiplini incelenmis¸tir. Rusya Federasyonu’ndaki mudiler, mevduatları-
nı sermaye yeterlilig˘i ve likiditesi yu¨ksek olan Rus bankalarına yo¨nlendirmis¸lerdir.
Benzer s¸ekilde Tu¨rk mudiler de sermaye yeterlilig˘i yu¨ksek olan bankaları tercih
etmis¸lerdir. Bunun yanı sıra, Tu¨rk mudilerinin 2001 krizinden sonra bankaların
artan kredi risklerini de dikkate aldıg˘ı go¨ru¨lmu¨s¸tu¨r. Analiz do¨neminde Tu¨rk
bankalarının Rus bankalarına go¨re daha verimli c¸alıs¸tıg˘ı go¨ru¨lmu¨s¸tu¨r. Ancak tu¨m
mevduatların devlet gu¨vencesi altında oldug˘u do¨nemde Tu¨rk mudilerin pazar di-
siplini uygulamadıg˘ı tespit edilmis¸tir. U¨c¸u¨ncu¨ makalede, I˙stanbul Menkul Kıymet-
ler Borsası’nda is¸lem go¨ren bankaların hisselerini satın alan farklı yatırım eg˘ilim-
lerine sahip yatırımcıların bankalar u¨zerindeki izleme ve etkileme yetileri ince-
lenmis¸tir. Bulgular, portfo¨y yatırımcılarının karlılık oranı yu¨ksek olan bankaları,
tek hisse senedine yatırım yapan yatırımcıların ise sermayesi, likiditesi ve verim-
lilig˘i yu¨ksek olan bankaları tercih ettig˘ini go¨stermektedir. Buna ilave olarak, ar-
tan varlık riskinin, banka sahip ve yo¨neticilerini bilanc¸o risklerini azaltma yo¨nu¨ne
sevkettig˘i go¨ru¨lmu¨s¸tu¨r. O¨zellikle ku¨c¸u¨k banka yo¨neticilerinin yu¨kselen varlık ris-
kini azaltmak amacıyla sermaye yeterlilig˘i rasyosunu yu¨kseltirken sorunlu kredileri
azalttıg˘ı tespit edilmis¸tir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Bankacılık, pazar disiplini, mevduat sahipleri disiplini,
hisse senedi sahipleri disiplini, yu¨kselen piyasalar, hisse fiyatları, Rusya Federas-
yonu, Tu¨rkiye.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The firm is a legal fiction that serves as a nexus of contracts between the various
stakeholders, as described by Jensen and Meckling (1976). The conflict of interest
between the stakeholders of a firm caused by the separation of the ownership and
control in corporations with many non-manager equityholders had been argued
since Adam Smith (1776). Agency problems arise since perfectly binding contracts
among the stockholders and creditors, stockholders and managers and inside and
outside equityholders1 do not exist. The agency theory was formalized by Jensen
and Meckling (1976) and applied to modern corporations by Fama (1980) and
Fama and Jensen (1983). As these studies unfold, corporations are efficient forms
of economic organizations. Additionally, their success all over the world has proven
that the benefits of such firms are sufficient to overcome agency costs. Although
1Inside equityholder owns 100 percent of the firm until the sales of the shares of the firm
to outside equityholders in order to raise external capital. Outside equityholders provide only
equity and inside equityholders provide both capital and management. Therefore in this thesis,
inside equityholders, who are the fractional owners managing the firm will be referred as owner-
managers.
1
agency costs are unavoidable, it can be reduced. Direct discipline is considered to
be a part of the solutions to costs arising because of the principal agent problem
between the managers and providers of capital2.
Agency costs caused by the conflict of interest among debtholders and outside
equityholders and owner-managers and outside equityholders can also be reduced
by the market signals as the increase in debt prices and decrease in stock prices.
Moreover, market may restrict the ability of the firm to generate external cap-
ital in the form of debt and equity. Consequently, the firm value reduces. In
the industries where public has strong interest such as banking, regulating the
industry is the first choice of the authorities to restrain the reduction in bank
asset value, in order to protect small investors, limit individual and systemic bank
failures. So, Regulatory discipline has depressed market discipline in mitigating
the agency costs. On the other hand, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Detragiache (2002),
using 1980−1997 data from 61 countries, present evidence that government regu-
lation and supervision of banks might be inadequate. Their findings reveal that
lax supervision accompanied with extensive deposit insurance result in financial
system instability and generate substantial loss to the public. Additionally, in-
novations in products and markets and advances in technology and information
processing originate a metamorphosis in banks, which become larger than their
traditional counterparts. Banks operate across a broader geographic area, offer
extensive range of products and become complex and opaque. More flexibility is
2Various direct discipline mechanisms are delegated monitors, mandatory disclosures of rel-
evant information, managerial compensations that align managers’ and equityholders’ interests,
threat of takeover, threat of being fired and direct intervention by the large outside equityholders.
2
needed in prudential regulation and supervision of banks as the pace of change in-
creases. During last two decades, supplementing regulation and supervision with
market discipline and its potential benefits attracted the academic and regulatory
interest. Research has demonstrated that market discipline supports bank super-
vision. Furthermore, regulatory authorities regard inclusion of market discipline
mechanisms in their supervisory process as desirable3 (See Flannery 1998). How-
ever, both researchers and regulators have reached a consensus market discipline
is not meant to replace governmental regulation and supervision, rather it is a
complementary mechanism and a part of bank regulation and supervision.
1.1 Market Discipline in Financial Markets
Berger (1991) states that market discipline in banking refers to a situation in which
private sector agents face costs that are positively related to the risks undertaken
by banks and react on the basis of these costs. Later, Lane (1993), in his seminal
work, defines market discipline in the context of financial markets as “financial
markets providing signals that lead borrowers (i.e. banks) to behave in a manner
consistent with their solvency”.
According to Bliss and Flannery (2002), market discipline has two components.
“Monitoring” refers to market participants’ incentives and ability to understand
changes in a firm’s condition and incorporate their opinion into the firm’s stock
and debt prices. Bliss (2004) states that, incentives to monitor depend on the
3See Third Pillar of New Basel Capital Accord (Basel II)
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costs and benefits of monitoring. Market participants will monitor the banks if
benefits of monitoring are more than its costs. Benefits of monitoring are related
to the size of the exposure. So, numerous equityholders and debtholders that
have small investments are considered to monitor less than the few stakeholders
with large investments do. Cost of monitoring is related to accessing information
conveniently. Transparency and information disclosure is the main issue because
in a transparent banking environment investors are able to collect information
about banks’ risks and prospects. The ability component refers to the proper
interpretation of the market information. When the investors incorporate their
assessments in the prices, they decide to buy or sell their investments of the
banks. So, market monitoring is reflected in equity prices, yield spreads of the debt
instruments, amount of transactions and changes in contract features concerning
derivatives.
The second component of market discipline is “Influence” which refers to the
process that the changes in market participants’ behavior induce the managers
to respond to adverse changes in firm condition. Kwast et al. (1999) define two
categories for “Influence”: “Direct Discipline” and “Indirect Discipline”. “Direct
Discipline” refers to the situation that bank managers avoid the increase in bank
risks when they anticipate higher cost of funding and risk of decrease in the will-
ingness to invest or transact. It is also known to be ex ante discipline. “Indirect
Discipline” occurs ex post, when private parties and government supervisors mon-
itor the market prices of debt instruments in order to determine bank risk taking.
Then these parties could increase the cost of funds to banks and limit the sup-
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ply of credits. Further they can reduce the bank’s ability to engage in derivative
contracts.
Power of market discipline derives from the ability of the price system, which is
an effective mechanism for conveying aggregate information from diverse sources
and transactions about the wealth maximizing motives of economic agents. Thus,
market discipline is considered to be forward-looking, flexible and continuous.
Berger (1991) identifies a number of benefits for the society that emerges from
the enhanced market discipline. First, market discipline may reduce moral hazard
problems that extensive government guarantees create for banks. Secondly, along
with the enforcement to limit bank risk taking, market discipline puts pressure
on banks to increase efficiency. Thirdly, markets react more quickly than the
regulators because they are anonymous, less susceptible to political pressure and
forbearance and continuously monitor bank risk taking. They are also exempt
from the political influence in specific bank closure decisions or actions taken
during the systemic problems in banking. Fourthly, Berger (1991) points out that
market discipline could reduce the regulatory burden on banks. Finally, by sending
market signals to bank managers, market discipline reduces part of the burden on
regulators created by the necessity to prove the deterioration in banks financial
position.
Despite of its benefits, market discipline has limitations. D’Avolio et al. (2001)
discuss that markets are not willing to generate enough information for investors
to allocate their funds appropriately and efficiently. Sometimes, even mislead-
ing information could be generated. Thus, there are limits to transparency when
5
markets are left alone. On the other hand, too much disclosure may induce bank
runs or systemic crisis because of the coordination failures among many dispersed
agents (Rochet and Vives 2002). Therefore, disclosure of accurate, relevant and
timely information has to be imposed by the regulators. There is also a conflict in
the goals of enhancing market discipline and protecting small and unsophisticated
investors. While extensive safety nets create moral hazard problem and increase
bank risk taking, increased market discipline may undermine the adequacy of the
safety nets and create instable and unsafe environment for unsophisticated depos-
itors. Furthermore, changing the liability structure of the banks, (i.e. manda-
tory subordinated debt proposals) may be an effective tool to discipline for large
banks. Although large banks may access to subordinated debt market with rea-
sonable costs, it is considered to be over-costly to small banks. So, discipline by
the uninsured debtholders would not exist. Finally, market participants could rely
on each other, stop monitoring and free riding replaces market discipline. Overall,
governments need to design right incentives for the market participants to engage
in effective market discipline. Market discipline and supervision are complements
to each other: they can not work efficiently without the other.
1.1.1 Agents of Market Discipline
Llewellyn and Mayes (2003) define agents of market discipline as stakeholders who
have an interest in the risk characteristics, safety and performance of a bank.
Major stakeholders of the bank include debtholders (including depositors and
bondholders), equityholders, regulators and borrowers. According to Bliss (2004),
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debtholders bear the credit risk associated with the risk taking of banks that they
lend to. Their return has no upside potential. Until maturity of the debt, pricing
remains constant. Incentives to discipline the banks contained in these contracts
are known to be heterogeneous. Depending on deposit insurance limits and the
maturity of the contracts, lenders impose different levels of discipline. Calomiris
and Kahn (1991) are the first to formally define market discipline, as depositors
having the incentive to monitor the bank, and prematurely withdraw their de-
mandable deposits. They emphasize that the depositors do not simply price the
risk (risk averse) but also act to limit it (risk intolerant). Llewellyn and Mayes
(2003) argue that insured depositors have little incentive to monitor because of the
explicit and implicit government guarantees. Uninsured depositors, for example
holders of Certificate of Deposits (CDs), form a better source of discipline than the
insured depositors do. CDs are for fixed terms with a known interest rate either
fixed or tied to short-term interest rates. However, most of the CDs are issued
with short-term maturity and can be traded in the secondary markets. Thus, bank
risk taking may not be priced accurately because short-term investors could easily
sell the CDs and exit when they perceive an increase in bank risk taking. More-
over, uninsured debtholders are considered to be the right participant for market
discipline purposes. Subordinated debt (SND), which is uninsured because of the
contract features, has long term maturity. SND contracts are similar to equity
because they are inferior to the other debt instruments and among the first to lose
value in the event of failure. Additionally, potential loss in the event of failure is
limited for SNDs. On the other hand, SND contracts are similar to other large
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debentures. Both types of debt instruments have no upside return potential and
they can be traded in the secondary market. Therefore, the incentives of the SND
holders are more linked to those of regulators.
Equity prices are considered to provide secondary market information to reg-
ulatory authorities. Equityholders have both upside and down side potential for
return. In one period analysis in the context of Black and Scholes (1973), equity-
holders will maximize their wealth by inducing managers to increase risk. Thus
by taking risks, the upside potential for returns in bank shares is unlimited. On
the other hand, equityholders may lose limited amount of investment in the event
of failure. Moreover, in a moral hazard situation, the costs of the excessive risk
taking will be borne by the deposit insurance scheme. So, the equityholders have
incentives to select risk-taking banks (see Evanoff 1993). On the other hand, eq-
uityholders have incentives to monitor bank risk taking behavior if the analysis
is extended to multiple periods. Increased risk results in the increased interest
expense for the corporation in the second period because debtholders of the firm
price risk. Consequently, expected cash flows of firm is reduced. Therefore, equity-
holders are considered to care for expected future cash flow and risk simultaneously
and prefer appropriate risk and return combinations.
Regulators as delegated monitors of the taxpayers are concerned with the ex-
cessive risk taking of the banks. Most of their efforts focus on monitoring the
safety and soundness of individual banks. However, they have the general aim to
ensure the safety and the soundness of the financial system. Although implemen-
tation of both functions supports each other, in rare occasions, in order to avoid
8
conflicts, supervisory forbearance may create implicit safety nets. Therefore, the
regulators need to rely on market information in order to improve bank super-
vision. Finally, borrowers are included in the major stakeholders group because
their business may be affected if a bank gets in to difficulty and calls the loans.
However the evidence on borrower discipline is rare (see Kim et al. 2005).
1.1.2 Pre-requisites for Market Discipline
In the context of Lane (1993), there are four conditions or pre-requisites to im-
plement market discipline of financial markets. First, capital markets must be
working. This condition requires that there exist efficient and unrestricted capital
markets in order to provide appropriate signals. Later Llewellyn and Mayes (2003)
improve this condition such that the markets should also efficiently incorporate
information about the changes in risk into prices. Moreover there should be suf-
ficient number of monitoring stakeholders. Secondly, there must be relevant and
accurate public disclosure of bank capital structure and risk exposures. Llewellyn
and Mayes (2003) add that the monitoring stakeholders should be able to interpret
and rationally adjust their behavior according to the information about the status
of the bank that they have an interest. Furthermore, behavioral adjustments by
stakeholders should lead to changes in the market quantities and prices. Thirdly,
market participants must not believe that the borrower would be bailed out in the
case of actual default. This condition is related to the incentives to market partic-
ipants to monitor the banks. Llewellyn and Mayes (2003) state that the benefits
of monitoring should be higher than its costs. Extensive explicit guarantees and
9
implicit guarantees like bail out and ‘Too-Big-To-Fail’ policies, which increase free
riding among the uninsured depositors and undermine market discipline should
be avoided. Finally, borrowers should be conscious about the change in market
quantities and prices and have the ability to respond to adverse market signals.
Empiric research has shown that pre-requisites for market discipline are evident
using developed markets’ data (see Gilbert 1990; Flannery 1998; Flannery and
Nikolova 2004 for extensive literature reviews about market discipline in developed
markets).
1.2 Market Discipline in Emerging Markets
In most of the emerging markets, not all of the necessary conditions for market
discipline are observed. Levy-Yeyati and Martinez-Peria (2004) discuss that mar-
ket discipline in the context of developed markets may be difficult to observe in
the emerging economies. Institutional characteristics of banking and macroeco-
nomic factors in these economies affect market discipline. The capital in flows and
outflows in the emerging markets provoke changes in macroeconomic conditions.
Because of the superior returns in emerging markets with respect to the devel-
oped markets, rapid international capital flows are observed. However, capital
flies quickly even due to small changes in developed economies and instability in
world politics. Levy-Yeyati and Martinez-Peria (2004) mention that rapid capital
inflows and outflows create large shocks in interest rates, exchange rates and out-
put volatility in emerging economies. Banks are subject to large systematic risks
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that might threaten the asset value. Moreover, stakeholders of the banks react to
the macroeconomic conditions, which are beyond the control of bank managers.
In such a circumstance, investors are not interested in individual bank fundamen-
tals no matter how strong they are. Therefore, traditional definition of market
discipline tests is not relevant for disclosing the sensitivity of the participants in
emerging markets to changes in bank risk taking. Levy-Yeyati and Martinez-
Peria (2004) argue that market responds to broader set of risks, which are driven
by macroeconomic conditions in the emerging markets. They conclude that, stud-
ies of market discipline in the emerging markets need to consider systemic risk
along with the bank specific risk factors.
Caprio and Honohan (2003) analyze the various aspects of market discipline
in developing countries. They question the belief that market discipline on banks
cannot be effective in less developed financial environments. Their study reveals
several results about various factors that affect the extent of market discipline
in emerging markets. First, government banks and foreign banks own impor-
tant shares in the banking industries of the developing countries. Foreign owned
banks are subject to home country market discipline rather than the host country
discipline. Government banks are equipped with the implicit deposit guarantees
at least to the extent of the government’s credibility. Therefore market disci-
pline by the local investors is not effective on both types of banks. However, in
markets where private ownership dominates, market discipline is better than the
pre-existing beliefs. Secondly, most of the emerging markets are dominated by the
few number of investors with large investments in different industries. Caprio and
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Honohan (2003) state that the quality and the relevance of information to a few
number of large investors about bank risk taking is higher than the information
available to government supervisors in these countries. Thirdly, share of total
banking assets of the listed banks in emerging markets varies extensively. They
argue that the probability for the existence of market discipline increases with the
increase in the share of total banking assets of the listed banks. Finally, rating
agencies also have disciplining effect on the emerging market banks. Their results
show that in the less developed countries, market discipline works better than the
general prejudice. They conclude that success of market discipline will improve
if the role of the explicit guarantees is limited, government ownership of banks is
reduced and greater disclosure is promoted.
The motivation of this thesis arises because of a couple of observations about
the banking industry in the Russian Federation and Turkey. First, professionals
of the banking industry in both of the countries observe indications of depositor
discipline. By the end of 2005, private banks owned by the local investors and
government controlled banks, dominate banking industry in both of the countries.
Government and private banks held 91.7 percent and 91.1 percent of the assets
of the banking sector in the Russian Federation and Turkey, respectively. Foreign
owned banks are very minor in both countries. So, home country discipline im-
posed on the foreign owned banks, as discussed in Caprio and Honohan (2003),
may not spread to the private and government banks. However local market dis-
cipline may exist. But, high deposit market share of the government controlled
banks, 62 percent and 38.8 percent in the Russian Federation and Turkey by the
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end of 2005, respectively, may undermine market discipline because of the implicit
guarantees provided by these banks. Overall depositors in both of the countries
have some incentives and barriers to discipline bank risk taking. Additionally,
both the Russian Federation and Turkey experienced severe crises in the near
past. As Levy-Yeyati and Martinez-Peria (2004) argue, depositors in both of the
countries may consider macroeconomic factors that are beyond the control of the
bank managers and owners more than the bank fundamentals in their investment
decisions. The extent of depositor discipline in both countries is interesting, but a
demanding issue that institutional and macroeconomic factors form obstacles for
the incentives to market participants to monitor and influence risk taking banks.
Secondly, in Turkey, share of the total banking assets of the listed banks4 is 64.8
percent of the assets of Turkish banking industry. Additionally, total value of share
trading of the five listed banks is 27.9 percent of the total value of share trading
in Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE). Both foreign and local outside equity investors
are observed to demonstrate a clear preference for bank shares. According to
Caprio and Honohan (2003) both of the indicators increase the probability that
the outside equity investor monitor and influence the risk taking by banks. On the
other hand, in the Russian Federation, only Sberbank is listed. Moreover, trading
volume of Sberbank shares is low because a large portion of the shares are held by
the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank of Russia. So, outside equityholder
discipline is neither observed nor expected in the Russian Federation.
In the first essay, market discipline of banking industry in the Russian Feder-
4By the end of 2006 there are thirteen listed banks in Turkey.
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ation Banking Industry is studied. Russian banking industry has gone significant
changes after the crisis in August 1998. Deposits of the banking industry have in-
creased and public confidence in the banking system has been established. Banks
in Russian Federation are distributed over a very large geography making it dif-
ficult to supervise. In such a banking system, market discipline can be useful in
monitoring bank risk taking behavior. Deposits and capital are the main funding
source for Russian banks. Debt instruments such as certificates of deposit (CD)
or subordinated debt (SND) do not exist. Furthermore, only Sberbank is listed.
Therefore, the analysis of market discipline in the Russian Banking Industry is
limited to depositor discipline. The reaction of Russian depositors to excessive risk
taking by banks during the period 2000:1−2005:1 is studied to test the existence
of market discipline. In this essay, other than the bank risk factors obtained from
the financial statements of the banks, macroeconomic risk factors and institutional
factors such as the ownership structure and the effects of deposit insurance system
are considered as independent variables affecting depositors. The results provide
evidence on the existence of quantity discipline. Banks significantly increase their
deposits during the analysis period in response to increases in capital and liquidity.
However Russian depositors have no price discipline on the banks in terms of de-
manding higher interest rates from risky banks. In a further analysis, we categorize
banks according to their level of capitalization and liquidity. We present evidence
that market discipline exists for under-capitalized and low-liquidity banks. De-
positors do not monitor the risk-taking behavior of the well-capitalized and liquid
banks. This may be due to explicit guarantees for state-owned bank and implicit
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guarantees for large sound banks. But, even large banks with less capital and
liquidity are subject to discipline by depositors.
In the second essay, depositors’ assessment of bank riskiness in the Russian
Federation and Turkey are evaluated. Turkey makes a better case for comparison
with the Russian banking industry because mainly local banks control the banking
industries and the share of government banks is declining in both of the countries.
Furthermore, since 2000, banking industries in both countries have undergone
major restructuring demonstrated by mergers, liquidations and improvements in
capital adequacy and management. Comparison of depositor behavior in both
countries provides evidence for monitoring. Indeed, Russian depositors reallocate
deposits either by holding on them or depositing in the safe state-owned banks
once information becomes available about the increased riskiness of a bank. On
the other hand, they have no price influence on the banks in terms of demanding
higher interest rates for increased risks. Banking industry in Turkey is compet-
itive and more developed than the banking industry in the Russian Federation.
However, between 1994−2004, there was extensive deposit insurance practice in
Turkey which might have undermined market discipline. Our findings support
that during the period of extensive guarantees, depositors’ monitoring of banks
becomes ineffective. Government reduced the guarantees after 2004 when restruc-
turing of the industry was accomplished. Then, depositors had the incentives to
monitor banks. According to the empirical findings, during the post-crisis pe-
riod, depositors in Turkey are concerned with the capital base and asset quality
of banks.
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One of the benefits of market discipline is considered to be the increasing
effect on the efficiency of banks and the banking system as a whole. In this es-
say, efficiency in the resource utilization by banks is also measured. After the
crises, operations of the banks in both countries improved resulting in more effi-
cient financial intermediation. Furthermore, there is evidence that, depositors in
the Russian Federation respond positively to banks with improved efficiency by
increasing their funds in these banks.
In the third essay, the market disciplining of banks in terms of the response
of the shareholders to risks incurred by the banks and the extent of influence of
different types of shareholders on management to limit risk-taking are measured.
Monitoring by shareholders would result in changes in the equity prices and re-
quired rates of return of banks. Differences exist in the ways portfolio investors
and owner-shareholders monitor bank risk taking. In addition, market discipline
implies that management observe the change in the market valuation of the bank
and respond to market signals by the shareholders by changing the composition
of the balance sheet.
Turkish banking industry provides a good test of the extent and the effective-
ness of monitoring and influence by shareholders. First, the period considered is
marked by high interest rate volatility, high inflation and low liquidity. So, one can
observe the reaction of shareholders to risk under extreme economic conditions.
Second, the period studied includes episodes of comprehensive guarantees on de-
posits. Also, the banking industry does not issue any subordinated debentures
and notes. So, any evidence of market discipline can be attributed to sharehold-
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ers. Third, there is a large volume of bank stocks traded at the Istanbul Stock
Exchange (ISE). Bank stocks account for about one-third of the trading volume
in ISE. Also, publicly traded banks account for about one-half of the banking in-
dustry’s assets. Forth, ownership structure is a determining factor in monitoring
bank risk-taking behavior.
It is shown in this essay that shareholders are sensitive to different measures
of risk and monitor the banks. Shareholders who own bank shares as part of
a portfolio are concerned about market risk and would not mind banks taking
excessive risk. However, for owner-managers total risk is relevant. Moreover,
given the institutional differences of the banks and the Turkish Banking industry,
owner-managers are influenced by market risk assessments. They are found to
play an important role in limiting risk-taking behavior by banks.
This thesis is organized as follows. In chapter two, first essay on depositors’
assessment of bank riskiness in the Russian Federation is presented. Disciplining
efforts of the depositors in the Russian Federation are compared to depositor
discipline in Turkey in the second essay, given in chapter three. The third essay
about owner-manager responses to outside equityholders’ monitoring behavior of
the public banks in Turkey is presented in chapter four. The thesis is concluded
in chapter five.
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CHAPTER 2
DEPOSITORS’ ASSESSMENT OF BANK
RISKINESS IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
2.1 Introduction
The New Basel Accord (2001) introduced guidelines for all major commercial
banks to promote safety, competition and a comprehensive approach to assess
risk-taking. The Accord framework includes, minimum risk-based capital require-
ments, an adequate supervisory review and market discipline as the three pillars
of a banking system. Moreover, the preconditions for the existence of a sound
banking system, as outlined by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), are
sustainable sound macroeconomic policies, a safety net for the public that funds
the banking system, and an efficient system of resolution of banks. The need for
market discipline of banks by stakeholders is especially important in jurisdictions
where it is difficult to impose minimum capital requirements and implement ef-
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fective bank supervision. Particularly, depositors’ monitoring and disciplining of
the banks can restrain disproportionate risk-taking. As depositors monitor bank
riskiness, they are expected to reallocate their funds within the banking industry
away from riskier banks. Since 1998, the Russian Banking Industry has undergone
significant changes both in terms of a reduction in the number of banks as well
as in establishing public confidence in the use of the banking system for financial
intermediation. Along with growing per capita income, more savings have been
channeled to the banking industry since 1999. As of 2005, there are 1,253 banks,
down from a high of over 3,300 in 1995, distributed over a very large geography
making it difficult to supervise and monitor. In such a banking system with a
large number of banks, market discipline imposed by depositors can be useful in
regulating bank risk-taking behavior. By providing more accurate, freely available
information about the banks’ financial status, the banking industry in the Russian
Federation would benefit from depositor discipline.
In order to measure the extent of market discipline in the Russian Banking
Industry we study the reaction of Russian depositors to excessive risk-taking by
banks during the period 2000:1-2005:1. However, Russian banking industry con-
sists of many banks that are not comparable to commercial banks operating in
other market economies. Therefore, we included in the sample banks with assets
more than $50 million accounting for 96 percent of all deposits in the industry1.
In accordance with the literature on market discipline, we test whether depositors
withdraw their funds or demand higher interest rates in response to high risk-
1In the empirical analysis, we estimated market discipline including all banks in addition to
our sample banks for robustness.
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taking by banks. The risk factors are obtained from the financial statements of
the banks. In addition, we account for the effects of other factors on deposits such
as economic factors as well as the deposit insurance system introduced in 20042.
We find that banks significantly increased their deposits during the analysis
period in response to increases in capital and liquidity as expected. These re-
sults indicate that market discipline is exercised by changes in deposits while in
other countries there is evidence that interest rates also play a disciplining role.
To understand the factors that contribute to the difference between the Russian
banking industry and banks in other countries, we analyze banks by categoriz-
ing according to their level of capitalization and liquidity. We present evidence
that market discipline exists for under-capitalized and low-liquidity banks. For
well-capitalized and liquid banks, depositors do not see the need to monitor their
risk-taking behavior. This may be due to explicit guarantees for state-owned bank
and implicit guarantees for large sound banks. But, even large banks with less
capital and liquidity are subject to discipline by depositors as demonstrated by the
sensitivity of deposits to bank risk factors such as capital and liquidity adequacy
and membership in the deposit insurance system.
The essay is organized as follows. In the second section we provide a brief
review of market discipline in various forms in developed as well as emerging mar-
kets. In section three, a brief review of the Russian banking industry is provided.
The model used in estimating the equations of depositor discipline is presented in
2In accordance with deposit insurance law of the Russian Federation, each depositor is guar-
anteed the full return of his or her deposits in each insured bank up to a maximum of 100,000
Rubles per account, inclusive. That figure corresponds to 1.1 times 2003 per capita Russian
GDP.
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section four. We describe the data in section five. In section six, we discuss the
estimation results. Conclusions are included in section seven.
2.2 Literature Review
Asset prices are effective mechanisms for conveying information about the wealth
maximizing motives of economic agents. Therefore, market participants can re-
strict the volume and cost of funding to signal unattractive risk-return trade-offs.
Market discipline describes a situation in which private sector agents, such as eq-
uity holders and debtholders produce information that helps supervisors in recog-
nizing problem banks and implementing corrective measures. Bliss and Flannery
(2002) identify two distinct components of market discipline as “monitoring” and
“influencing”. Monitoring occurs when investors incorporate changes in a firm’s
risk-taking in stock or bond prices. Influencing refers to the ability of market
participants to affect a firm’s financial decisions. Berger (1991) states that bank
stakeholders face costs that increase as firms undertake risks and stakeholders take
action because of these costs3. There are three broad classes of market reactions.
First, depositors may require higher interest rates. Second, investors may with-
draw uninsured funds from the bank. Finally the bank may be forced to restore
its financial condition.
Calomiris and Kahn (1991) are the first to formally define market discipline
as depositors having the incentive to monitor the bank and prematurely withdraw
3The stakeholders are depositors, shareholders, and creditors.
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their demandable deposits. They emphasize that the depositors do not simply
price the risk (risk averse) but also act to limit it (risk intolerant). Flannery (1998)
empirically points out that the liability market for the banks are sensitive to the
changes in banks’ financial conditions and investors identify and act according to
the default risk changes. Recent research on cross-country supervisory framework
emphasizes the importance and the need for enhanced transparency obtained by
the disclosure of relevant information and the reinforcement of market discipline
(see Barth et al. 2002; 2003; and 2004). Empirical evidence supports market dis-
cipline based on improved financial information disclosures, and enhancing market
participants’ ability to assess and control banks’ risks in the US and Europe (see
Gilbert 1990; Flannery 1998; and Flannery 2001). In addition, market discipline
can be established using the relationship between risk indicators and subordinated
debt yields or large deposit rates. Risk premia on subordinated notes and deben-
tures are correlated with accounting risk measures, asset portfolio composition,
credit agency or regulatory ratings, and the probability of failure (see Jagtiani
and Lemieux 2001; Morgan and Stiroh 2001; Sironi 2002; Evanoff and Wall 2002;
and Jagtiani et al. 2002).
As an alternative to subordinated debt, Hall et al. (2002a) document a pos-
itive relation between the yields on certificates of deposits (CD) and financial
ratios of the banks that have a satisfactory regulatory rating. However, Jagtiani
and Lemieux (2001) find no evidence of market discipline in the uninsured CD
market using a sample of bank holding companies with failing subsidiaries. More-
over, Furfine (2001) provides evidence of market discipline in the overnight federal
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funds market where creditors require interest rates dependent on the credit risk
of the borrowers. Market discipline can also exist in the form of decreases in the
availability of uninsured funds because investors withdraw their funds if they be-
lieve that the bank is becoming more risky. Furthermore, the higher borrowing
costs of the uninsured funds may force the banks to shift to insured funds. Con-
sistent with market discipline, Billet et al. (1998), Jagtiani and Lemieux (2001),
and Hall et al. (2002a) show that as the financial condition of the bank worsens
their reliance on insured funds increases (see Goldberg and Hudgins 1996; Park
and Peristiani 1998; and Goldberg and Hudgins 2000 for similar results on thrifts).
Banks are the dominant financial intermediaries in emerging markets. In ad-
dition to the opaqueness of ordinary banking activities, frequent financial crises,
state ownership of banks, and inadequate supervision necessitate close monitoring
of financial institutions by the market. Market discipline by shareholders, credi-
tors, and depositors can control the risk-taking behavior of banks. While in most
developed financial markets, shareholders demonstrate their assessment of a listed
bank’s risk-taking in the the market value of the bank, market prices have no role
or a very limited role in emerging markets. Banks are either privately held or the
traded shares are a very small portion of the outstanding bank shares in emerg-
ing markets4. Furthermore, in developing financial markets, there is very little
subordinated debt that is valued in secondary markets reflecting bank riskiness.
4Even if the bank stocks are traded, the number of shares held by outside equityholders
is usually very small. For example, the only bank stock traded in the Russian Trading System
(RTS) is the state-owned Sberbank. The shares traded are a very small portion of the outstanding
shares. A very large majority of shares are held by the Ministry of Finance and the Central
Bank of Russia.
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Thus, in countries where the availability of instruments for market discipline is
limited due to inadequate listed bank equity or subordinated debt, depositors are
the primary source for disciplining bank risk-taking behavior. The combination
of government regulation and supervision and monitoring by depositors would re-
sult in high quality banks that are conducive to financial intermediation without
risking depositors funds.
Empirical studies of market discipline for the developing countries focuses on
the behavior of depositors. Most of the evidence about the existence and efficacy of
market discipline comes from Latin America. Calomiris and Powell (2001) report
that in Argentina high asset risk and leverage are associated with greater deposit
withdrawals and high asset risk is reflected in higher deposit interest rates. Bara-
jas and Steiner (2000) study market discipline by depositors in Colombia. They
show that the depositors prefer banks with strong fundamentals namely, high cap-
italization, liquidity, low non-performing loans and profitability. Martinez-Peria
and Schmukler (2001) test interaction in the 1980s and the 1990s between market
discipline and deposit insurance and the impact of banking crises on market disci-
pline in Argentine, Mexico and Chile. Their findings support the view that there
is market discipline across all three countries. Depositors reduce the level of their
deposits and increase the interest rate demanded from those banks undertaking
high risks. Their results also suggest that the deposit insurance in these three
countries is not fully credible and both insured and uninsured depositors exercise
market discipline. Moreover, according to the evidence provided, market disci-
pline by depositors separately increased in Argentina, Chile and Mexico following
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a bank crisis.
In another study on the existence of depositor discipline in India, Ghosh and
Das (2003) focus on the Indian Banking Industry during the 1990s after the liber-
alization of the banking sector. Bank fundamentals are significant in determining
the changes in deposits and interest paid. Therefore, the authors argue that depos-
itors in India punish banks for risky behavior during the analysis period. Ungan
and Caner (2004) study the existence of market discipline in Turkey. They esti-
mate that there was evidence of market discipline in the Turkish banking industry
in the 1988-2003 period. It is observed that uninsured depositors closely monitored
the risk indicators obtained from financial data. However, the introduction of full
deposit insurance ceased the monitoring motives for both insured and uninsured
depositors.
There is a paucity of study that analyzes depositor discipline in the transi-
tion economies. Mondschean and Opiela (1999) provide findings regarding market
discipline in Poland during 1992-1996. Their results suggest that the depositors
demand higher interest rate for the risky banks before the changes in the insur-
ance scheme and that the fully insured banks pay lower interest rates as expected.
Moreover, the state-owned banks have both implicit and explicit coverage. They
conclude that the full deposit insurance scheme and government ownership of Pol-
ish banks reduce the monitoring incentives of the market participants. Recently,
Karas et al. (2004) examine market discipline in the Russian deposit market for the
period 1997-2002. They provide evidence for market discipline using all operating
credit institutions’ data. Their data set covers small banks that usually collects
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deposits of several depositors, mainly the owners. Furthermore their data set in-
cludes the 1998 crisis period when the financial statements of the banks are not
transparent. Therefore the significance of their results varies by the sub-periods
chosen and types of depositors.
2.3 Banking in the Russian Federation
During the Soviet period when the economy was state-controlled and centrally-
planned, the government owned and managed the banking system in the Russian
Federation. Gosbank was the central bank and the only commercial bank. Savings
were kept in another state-owned bank, Sberbank. There were also two other
state banks, Vneshtorgbank that handled foreign trade transactions and Stroybank
that provided investment credits for enterprises. Following the economic reforms
to establish a market-based system in 1991, the Russian Banking System has
evolved into a two-tier system including the central bank and the commercial
banks. Until 1995, the regulation of the commercial banks by the Central Bank
of the Russian Federation (CBR) was quite lax, which led to the existence of
numerous commercial banks of suspectable quality. By the end of 1995, there
were over 3,300 banks most of which were small and had little capitalization.
A large portion of the banks were financially linked to companies and provided
subsidized credits.
The Russian Banking System was shaken by the financial crisis of 1998. Repay-
ments of private and public external debt were temporarily frozen. Devaluation of
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the ruble and low levels of liquidity led to the bankruptcy of many banks. How-
ever, Russian banks already had serious problems before the 1998 crisis. They had
poor capitalization, low liquidity, and high exposure to exchange rate risk. Fur-
ther, they were reluctant to act as intermediaries between borrowers and savers
for several reasons. First, there was a large informational asymmetry between
the banks and the customers. Second, the banks were not equipped with the
screening and monitoring skills needed to avoid credit risks. They were not able
to discriminate credit risks of potential borrowers. Third, the banks could not
reclaim their loans due to the weak rule of law and enforcement. Fourth, some of
the small banks were purchased by newly established undercapitalized enterprises
to be used as their “pocket banks”5. Consequently, there did not exist a real
banking industry in the earlier years after the break up of the Soviet Union. Few
banks were able to operate at the national level. Moreover, many banks do not
have branches in the regions of the Russian Federation.
During the 1998 crisis, many banks were either bankrupt or liquidated. Most
of the illiquid banks were allowed to operate until March 1999 when the CBR
started restructuring the Russian banking system. By the end of the first half
of 2005, the Russian economy has experienced seven years of robust economic
growth and the Russian Banking industry has also recovered. Since 2002, CBR
has strengthened the financial conditions in the banking industry by issuing new
prudential regulations. With the introduction of the deposit insurance system
in 2004, prudential standards were further strengthened. The introduction of
5These banks facilitate borrowing at favorable terms by owners. In addition, banks can be
used in reducing the tax liability of the owners.
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Table 2.1: Russian Banking Sector (2000-2005)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Nominal GDP 7,302.2 8,944.0 10,818.0 13,201.0 16,779.0 21,617
(billion rubles)
Total Banking Sector
Assets 2,260.9 3,159.7 4,145.3 5,600.7 7,136.9 9,750
(billion rubles)
Share of GDP (%)
Total Assets 30.96 35.33 38.32 42.43 42.53 45.10
Total Capital 5.07 5.37 6.17 5.64 5.70
Total Loans 13.16 14.71 17.17 18.77 19.0
Total Deposits† 9.53 7.58 9.52 11.47 11.71 12.81
Other Bank Funds‡ 10.09 10.09 10.49 11.84 13.73
Share of Total Assets (%)
Total Capital 14.37 14.02 14.55 13.26 12.64
Total Loans 37.24 38.39 40.48 44.14 42.20
Total Deposits 30.78 21.45 24.84 27.04 27.52 28.31
Other Bank Funds 28.57 26.33 24.73 27.83 30.30
Source: Central Bank of the Russian Federation Banking Supervision Report, 2004. †Includes
only household deposits. ‡Other bank funds are mainly funds obtained from other bank and
non-bank financial institutions.
the deposit insurance system created an opportunity for the CBR to thoroughly
examine all the banks6. With the anticipation of a membership in the deposit
insurance system, many banks started to improve their balance sheets long before
the CBR examinations. Banks that were admitted to the new deposit insurance
scheme after being examined by the CBR account for 98 percent of deposits.
Nevertheless, key problems remain to be addressed such as strengthening creditor
rights and expanding the implementation of International Accounting Standards
(IAS).
In Table 2.1, aggregate measures of the Russian banking sector from 2000 to
6Deposit insurance, introduced in 2004, has limited power in terms of supervision and regu-
lating banks. These functions exclusively remain at the CBR. So, the newly established deposit
insurance agency operates like a cash box. In 2005, the Agency was also given authority to
liquidate banks.
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2005 are presented. The asset-to-GDP ratio of banks increased from 31.0 percent
in 2000 to 45.1 percent in 2005. In the meanwhile, capital ratios remained more
or less the same. Banks were able to expand their loan portfolios as demand from
the corporate sector and households increased. As of end of 2005 there were 1253
active banks, of which 32 were state banks. The number of foreign banks increased
to 51. The number of branches which are very few declined from 3,793 to 3,295 (see
Figure 2-1). Most of the decline in the number of branches is due to Sberbank’s
closing of branches in major urban areas. However, the second largest state bank
Vneshtorgbank and foreign banks increased the number of their branches during
the same period. Furthermore, foreign banks paid higher interest rates compared
to other banks which increased their market share. The industry started facing
competition from foreign banks after 2004.
Central Bank of Russian Federation classifies banks according to ownership,
type of funding, clientele and risk characteristics. Table 2.2 demonstrates the bank
clusters identified by the CBR and their shares of assets and capital. Accordingly,
state-owned banks provided 40.7 percent of assets and 33.8 percent of capital in
the banking industry. State-owned banks and diversified banks jointly provide
about 70 percent of total corporate loans with state-owned banks’ share at about
47 percent. These two groups of banks also provided 75 percent of loans to the
households. Intra-group banks are defined by the CBR as those banks controlled
by one or few related owners. These banks are also characterized by recurring
large loans to few borrowers. The largest groups of banks are small and medium-
sized banks in the Moscow region. However, their shares of total banking industry
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Figure 2-1: Number of Banks by Ownership and Number of Branches
assets and capital remain small.
Since 2004, long-term borrowing and corporate deposits as a source of funding
have grown faster than household deposits. Corporate deposit growth was mainly
in diversified banks, state-owned banks and the foreign-owned banks. Moreover,
due to their good international credit ratings, state-owned and diversified banks
were able to raise funds in the international interbank market thus, reducing their
reliance on deposits. As a result, the share of Sberbank in household deposits
declined from 60 percent to 54 percent. However, half of this decline was captured
by another state-owned bank, Vneshtorgbank. Foreign banks also experienced
large increases in household deposits. Interestingly enough, small and medium-
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Table 2.2: The Clustering of Russian Banks (by the end of 2005)
Share of Share of
Credit Institutions Number Total Assets Total Capital
State-controlled Banks 32 40.7 33.8
Foreign-controlled Banks 51 8.3 9.2
Intra-group Banks† 109 16.2 19.4
Diversified Banks†† 74 25.1 23.4
Small and Medium Banks in Moscow 455 5.1 8.6
Regional Small and Medium Banks 484 4.2 5.4
Non-bank Credit Institutions 48 0.5 0.2
Total 1,253 100.0 100.0
Source: Central Bank, Bank Supervision Report, 2005. †Intra-group banks are those controlled
by several related owners. CBR identifies them according to large loans per borrower and
preferential lending. ††Diversified banks are large banks neither controlled by the state nor
foreign-owned and do not belong to intra-groups.
sized banks in the Moscow region and other regions that were admitted to the
deposit insurance system observed the least growth in their household deposits.
According to CBR (2006), the banking industry is concentrated in the deposit
market. The top 200 banks (16 percent of all banks), which the CBR uses as a
benchmark, account for 89.6 percent of the total bank assets and 85 percent of the
industry’s total capital. The biggest bank, Sberbank, accounts for 28.6 percent of
all banking industry assets, 54 percent of deposits and 33 percent of total equity
in the banking industry.
The top five banks’ share in terms of assets in banking industry declined from
45 percent to 43.8 percent in 2005. During the same period the share of top five
bank in total banking industry’s equity increased from 34 percent to 36 percent.
Furthermore, the number of banks with excess capital over the statutory capital
amount of 5 million euros increased from 501 to 602. Thus, banks increasingly
relied on own funds and corporate deposits to fund asset acquisition since 2004.
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The Russian banking industry has low levels of concentration in terms of as-
sets, loans and capital. However, household deposits continue to be concentrated
despite a steady decline observed in the last three years. Concentration levels
measured by Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for assets is about 0.09 and fairly
stable (see CBR, 2005). HHI for loans was estimated to be at 0.12 in 2005 up
from 0.105 in 2004. The concentration ratio for capital was at 0.05 in 2005. HHI
concentration value for household deposits was at 0.3 in 2005 down from 0.4 in
20047. These estimates indicate high concentration in the deposit market. The
decline in the concentration of deposits is primarily due to the reduction in the
deposits in Sberbank. The government plans to sell the remaining state-owned
shares once Sberbank’s share of total deposits decline to less than 50 percent possi-
bly, in 2008. So, one can expect further decline in deposit concentration. While it
is declining, high concentration ratios for deposits have implications for depositor
discipline in banks in the Russian Federation. Households placing their deposits
in few large banks demonstrate that it is safer to deposit in few large banks and
enjoy guarantees on deposits. Furthermore, despite the growth in the utilization
of the banking services, the infancy of the deposit insurance system might have in-
creased the tendency of depositors to put their savings in larger banks and benefit
from “Too-Big-To-Fail” protection.
7HH Index is a commonly accepted measure of market concentration. It is calculated by the
squaring of the market shares of each bank competing in the market and then summing the
resulting numbers. It ranges between zero and one. HHI less than 0.1 is considered low concen-
tration, 0.1 to 0.2 is medium concentration and bigger than 0.2 is considered high concentration.
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2.4 Empirical Model
We have three questions in this essay. First, did market discipline exist in the Rus-
sian Federation; that is, did the preceding bank specific risk factors significantly
explain the change in bank deposits and interest rates on deposits? Second, did
the market discipline change significantly after the introduction of limited deposit
insurance? Third, while controlling for bank risk variables and other factors, did
bank ownership structure affect the change in deposits and the interest rates?
According to Calomiris and Kahn (1991), depositors facing increase in bank
risk-taking can either demand high interest rates or withdraw funds from the
bank. In order to examine depositor behavior, we estimate two models, one for
the change in deposits and one for the interest rates. Therefore, we have a vector
of variables Zj = [Z1, Z2], where Z1 is the change in deposits and Z2 is the interest
rate. In each model, we test whether bank specific risk factors, macroeconomic
factors, bank ownership structure and deposit insurance significantly affect the
behavior of depositors. In the tests of the existence of depositor discipline in
Russian Federation during the period 2000:1 to 2005:1, we estimate the following
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reduced form model using quarterly data:
Zij,t = αj +
2∑
j=1
βjZ
i
j,(t−1) +
5∑
k=1
φj,k Risk
i
k,(t−1) +
2∑
p=1
γj,p Macrop,(t−1)
+
2∑
q=1
δj,q Bank
i
q,t +
2∑
l=1
ψj,l Size
i
l,(t−1) + ϕj DIDummyt
+
5∑
k=1
θj,k Risk
i
k,(t−1) ·DIDummyt
+
2∑
l=1
λj,l Size
i
l,(t−1) ·DIDummyt + ui,t (2.1)
such that i = 1, . . . N , t = 1, . . . T , j = 1, 2. N is the number of banks in the
Russian Federation, T is the number of observations per bank that varies across
institutions due to the unbalanced panel, and ui,t is the error term. Z
i
1,t is the
percentage change in the deposits, and Zi2,t is the implicit deposit interest rate.
They both measure depositors’ assessment of bank riskiness for bank i at time t.
Zi2,t is calculated as the ratio of interest expense to total deposits in the pre-
vious period, similar to previous studies in the market discipline literature (for
example, Martinez-Peria and Schmukler 2001 for Argentina, Chile and Mexico;
and Mondschean and Opiela 1999 for Poland). Although theoretically marginal
rates indicate the sensitivity of interest rates on deposits to change in bank risk-
iness, as the marginal interest rates are not available, implicit interest rates are
used in this essay. However, as the majority of deposits are short-term in the
Russian Federation, it can be argued that the difference would not be significant
enough to alter results. Nevertheless, Peresetsky et al. (2006) use marginal in-
terest rates for selected banks (26 banks were contacted to obtain interest rates
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on deposits of various size and maturity) to understand how interest rates are
determined in the Russian Federation and find results similar to our study where
implicit interest rates on deposits are used.
(Riskik,t) denotes the five factors are included in the estimations as the sources
of risk after controlling for other factors such as macroeconomic fluctuations that
affect bank balance sheets. The proxies for bank riskiness are the following fi-
nancial ratios: non-performing loans-to-assets, loans-to-assets, capital-to-assets,
net profit after tax-to-assets and liquid assets-to-assets. Macroeconomic impacts
(Macrop,t), are controlled by changes in the consumer price index (CPI) and the
dollar-ruble exchange rate. Bank ownership status (Bankiq,t), is described by two
dummy variables that account for the state and foreign ownership. These variables
are incorporated to the model for the sake of controlling institutional strategies of
banks on deposit growth and interest rates. (Sizeil,t), size of the bank is charac-
terized by two variables: natural logarithm of asset size of a bank and the relative
size of the bank’s total deposits in its total funding base. The bank’s total funding
base includes deposits, interbank loans and long-term debt. DIDummyt is a time
dummy that identifies periods of deposit insurance after its introduction in the
second half of 2004.
In accordance with the literature on market discipline, it is expected that
an increase in both non-performing loans-to-assets, loans-to-assets will negatively
affect deposit growth. On the other hand, increasing riskiness, due to high non-
performing loans and indebtedness, positively affects the interest paid on deposits.
Increases in capital-to-asset, net after-tax profit-to-assets, and liquid assets-to-
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assets ratios indicate a reduction in the riskiness of banks.
In addition to the relation between bank riskiness and depositors’ reaction to
risk, we control for economic and banking sector factors that might affect growth
in deposits and the deposit interest rates. First, two major price variables: per-
centage change in CPI and fluctuations in the ruble-dollar parity, are included
in equation 2.1 to account for the impact of macroeconomic fluctuations on de-
positors’ behavior. Second, the ownership status of Russian banks state, private
or foreign, are included in order to control the institutional strategies of different
banks on interest rates and source of funds. We also use two different size mea-
sures; assets of a bank and the relative size of a bank’s total deposits in its total
funding base. Finally, the dummy variable DIDummyt interacts with risk factors
and the size variables after the introduction of the deposit insurance system.
The model described in 2.1 is a reduced form specification of deposit demand
and supply relationship. We include the lagged dependent variables in each equa-
tion to account for the dynamics of the dependent variables. In a similar model
studied by Martinez-Peria and Schmukler (2001), the simultaneity of the two de-
pendent variables is ignored and their results are biased (e.g., see Gourieroux and
Monfort (1995), pp. 297-322).
2.5 Data
Quarterly bank-level data is obtained from data services provider Mobile Infor-
mation Services and covers the period from 2000:1 to 2005:1. Considering major
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macroeconomic fluctuations and reporting quality, we use the data after 1999
excluding the crisis year of 1998 and its aftermath. The 2000-2005 period is a
financially stable period for the Russian financial markets and the quality of the
financial statements are substantially better compared to prior years8. The data
set included 1,461 commercial banks operating in the Russian Federation during
the 2000-2005 period. Asset size of banks varies from $2 billion for the largest bank
to less than $10,000. We exclude small banks and estimate market discipline by
depositors using two separate groups of banks. Small banks are excluded because
96 percent of deposits are placed in large banks. In most cases, small banks have
few depositors. Often, the few depositors a small bank has are either the owners,
a large firm or local administrations. So, the possibility that external depositors
may have any influence on bank risk-taking by small banks is very unlikely. The
first data set includes only the biggest 50 banks in the Russia Federation accord-
ing to asset size in 2005. The second data set includes 377 banks with assets
more than $50 million in 2005. Eight of the banks are excluded from the data
set because of insufficient number of consecutive financial information during the
analysis period. Therefore, only 369 banks are included for estimation purposes
in the data set.
In Table 2.3, we report the nominal amount and industry shares of total assets,
total loans, total deposits and total capital. Banks with assets greater than $50
million are named as “Big Banks” and account for about 95 percent of the total
8Starting 2002, CBR introduced new regulations to improve reporting by banks. Since
2004, CBR requires the new methodology to be used in the calculation of capital and liquidity
adequacy ratios.
37
Table 2.3: Summary of Banks’ Balance Sheet Activities (by the end of March
2005)
Total Assets Total Loans Total Deposits Total Capital
billion billion billion billion
Banks Rubles %§ Rubles % Rubles % Rubles %
All 7089 100 3635 100 2439 100 939 100
Top 50 Banks† 5226 74 2778 76 1993 82 578 62
Big Banks‡ 6706 95 3464 95 2353 96 842 90
§Share in the Russian Banking industry. †“Top 50 Banks” by asset size. ‡Assets above $50
million.
assets and loans. “Big Banks” account for 96 percent of total deposits and 90
percent of the total capital in the Russian banking industry. Depositor discipline
of the “Top 50 Banks” are also analyzed separately as they are the money-center
banks that dominate the Russian economy. “Top 50 Banks” represent 74 percent
of the assets and 76 percent of total loans given by the banking industry. They
also account for 82 percent of the deposits and 62 percent of the capital of the
banking industry.
Table 2.4 shows the descriptive statistics for both the “Big Banks” and the
“Top 50 Banks”. On average, the “Top 50 Banks” pay lower implicit interest
rates on deposits compared to banks with assets worth $50 million or more. Con-
sequently, these banks are relatively less successful in attracting new deposits.
Average growth rate in deposits is 16.65 percent for the “Big Banks” while it is
only 14.92 percent for the “Top 50 Banks”. Net non-performing loans, as a share
of assets, are marginally lower for the “Top 50 Banks”. Moreover, the “Top 50
Banks” operate with lower capitalization and liquidity and, they are more prof-
itable than the banks with assets $50 million or more.
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Table 2.4: Descriptive Statistics for (2000:1-2005:1)
Banks with Top 50
Assets > $50 million Banks
(N=369) (N=50)
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
Dependent Variables (%)
Growth in Deposits 16.65 65.58 14.92 52.29
Implicit Interest Rate 13.00 113.66 9.3 30.78
Bank Risk Variables (%)
Non-Performing Loans/Assets 0.13 0.52 0.12 0.37
Total Loans/Assets 37.24 18.35 39.32 17.36
Total Capital/Assets 21.36 14.26 16.71 10.15
Net Profit After Tax/Assets 2.14 2.77 2.53 2.76
Liquid Assets/Assets 44.06 26.91 43.54 60.02
Size Variables
Assets (in natural logarithm) 21.46 1.5 23.72 1.41
Total Deposits/Total Funding Base (%) 92.52 18.87 85.50 23.98
Source: Mobile Information Services.
2.6 Empirical Results
The empirical model described in equation 2.1 is estimated using pooled cross-
sectional time series data for the period 2000:1 to 2005:1. First, we estimated
the model using ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for the “Big Banks”
and the “Top 50 Banks” as well as for all banks. Then, in order to account for
the differences across individual banks, the fixed-effect model which captures the
differences by the constant terms for each member of the panel data is estimated9.
The coefficient estimates, both with OLS and the fixed-effect model for the
deposit growth equation, are presented in Table 2.5. The first column of the
Table 2.5 are for all banks, while columns 2 and 3 include estimates for “Big
9Due to the existence of large number of banks in the Russian Federation, we could not
estimate the fixed-effect model for all banks.
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Banks.” Columns 4 and 5 include the estimates of “Top 50 Banks.” The difference
in estimated coefficients between all banks and the large banks can be attributed
to the small banks. It can be observed that the effect of small banks on estimated
coefficients for lagged deposit growth rates and interest rates are not different from
those of the large banks, both in terms of sign and size. If the deposit accumulation
rate is high in the previous period, then there is a significant slowdown in the
deposit growth of both small and large banks. Moreover, if banks offer higher
interest rates in the previous period, then the funds deposited in these banks
increase significantly, with an increasing pace as the banks grow in assets.
For all three data set including all banks, banks with assets more than $50
million and “Top 50 Banks”, two risk factors have significant effect on the deposit
growth during the sample period. As expected, higher capital-to-asset ratio and
higher liquid assets-to-asset ratio increase growth in deposits implying depositors’
preference for well-capitalized and liquid banks. Only, OLS estimation of capital-
to-asset ratio is not significant for the “Top 50 Banks” group. These findings also
suggest that the ability to access their funds anytime appears to be significantly
important for the depositors in the Russian Federation.
Higher loans-to-asset ratio for large banks and especially for the “Top 50
Banks” has a positive effect on deposit growth. Total loans are only significant
in the OLS estimates of large banks at 10 percent level with the wrong sign. For
the “Top 50 Banks”, loans are significant at 5 percent but with the wrong sign
again. Since loans-to-asset ratio is used as proxy for credit risk, this result is
not consistent with the expectations. The positive sign of loan-to-asset ratio im-
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plies that loan expansion is not perceived as a risk factor by depositors. It can
be argued that depositors view the financing of profitable loans by non-deposit
sources as a benefit in terms of higher interest earnings. Consequently, depositors
do not consider, growth in loans financed by different sources, as a risk to their
savings. In particular, the significant positive relationship between deposit growth
and higher loans-to-asset ratio for the “Top 50 Banks” indicates their ability to
find international funding cheaper than domestic deposits. Most of the “Top 50
Banks” have good credit rating and have no difficulty in obtaining funds from
corporations and international banks.
The estimated coefficients of interaction dummies with deposit insurance shows
that the introduction of deposit insurance alters the behavior of depositors of small
banks. Since the interaction dummies of all banks turns to be insignificant for all
risk factors, it can be argued that deposit insurance impaired the disciplinary
efforts of the depositors against small banks. Nevertheless, depositors of large
banks continue to seek banks with high capital-to-assets ratios. Furthermore,
depositors of the “Top 50 Banks” prefer profitable banks after the introduction of
deposit insurance. The general public has not been aware of the full benefits of
the insurance and also, banks have not been aggressive enough to sell the benefits
of being a member bank in the insurance system. It can be argued that sufficient
time has not lapsed for the depositors to diversify their deposits based on the
assessment of banks after the introduction of the deposit insurance system. In
addition, CBR in admitting the qualifying banks to the insurance system may
have biased in favor of well-capitalized banks.
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State ownership was not a major factor in determining deposit growth. How-
ever, among the “Top 50 Banks”, depositors prefer state banks even though this
result is only supported in the OLS estimation. In addition, size was only signifi-
cant and with the correct sign for banks with assets more than $50 million. Since
they are all “Big Banks”, this variable is not significant for the “Top 50 Banks”.
Estimated coefficients of risk factors affecting interest rates on deposits are
presented in Table 2.6. When banks observe increases in deposits in the previous
period, they reduce current interest payments on deposits. However, the magni-
tude of the response of small banks is much bigger compared to large banks. small
banks are compelled to reduce deposits due to limited ability to allocate excess
funds.
Further, banks follow the trend in interest rate on deposits paying higher in-
terest rates if interest rates are on the rise in the previous period. They continue
to offer same interest rates on deposits, however at a decreasing rate. We do not
observe differences in the response of small and large banks.
For the “Top 50 Banks”, capital-to-asset ratio, liquidity ratio and profitability
are found to be significantly affecting the interest rates paid on deposits. However,
the signs indicate that less risky banks, namely those that can increase their
capitalization, liquidity and profitability, paid higher interest rates during the
analysis period. These findings imply that to a large extent interest rates are
determined by large banks that do not want to lose market share on deposits to
growing mid-sized and foreign banks. In particular, since capital-to-asset ratio of
the large banks are already relatively low (see Table 2.4), they use deposits more
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as a major source of funding. We also observed that foreign banks in the “Top
50 Banks” group paid significantly higher interest rates on deposits to increase
market share in the domestic deposit market.
As seen in Table 2.6, size plays a significant role in the determination of the
interest rates on deposits. More precisely, as the asset size increases, large banks
pay lower interest rates, in contrast, small banks pay higher rates. This conflicting
pricing by banks of different sizes indicates the effort of small banks to attract more
deposits for improving their inadequate source of external funds from depositors.
Especially, due to the fact that there has been a decrease in the accumulation of
deposits in the large banks since 2001 (mainly the decline of Sberbank’s share),
small banks had to pay a price to obtain more deposits.
The introduction of deposit insurance provided an opportunity for banks to
improve their financial balances. As it can be seen from the coefficients of the
interaction dummies, large banks with adequate capitalization were able to reduce
interest expenses once they were admitted to the deposit insurance system. Small
banks, once admitted to the deposit insurance system tried to attract deposits by
offering higher interest rates. Membership in the deposit insurance system also
requires increases in the capital for many small banks. Until 2005, more than half
of the banks had equity less than 5 million Euros, the statutory threshold. By
2008, all member banks in the deposit insurance system have to have minimum
capital more than the statutory threshold. So, most of the increases in capital-
to-asset ratios since 2003 can be attributed to small banks trying not to lose
their licenses to collect deposits. This can be confirmed with the large significant
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coefficient of interaction dummy for the capital-to-asset ratios of small banks.
One variable which had no effect on disciplining banks by depositors is the non-
performing loans-to-asset ratio. While it is considered an important variable in
identifying banks’ riskiness in the developed markets, it has no significant impact
on the deposits and/or interest rates paid by banks in the Russian Federation.
It appears that it is hard to identify the impact of a change in the bad loans
on deposits or interest rates using quarterly data due to the treatment of non-
performing loans by the CBR. There is strict write-off regulation which has been
in effect since 2002 that does not allow banks to carry non-performing assets longer
than 90 days on their balance sheets. Since banks comply with this requirement
(or roll them over into new loans), non-performing loans-to-asset ratios of banks
are insignificant in the estimated depositor discipline equations.
While we use relatively large banks to demonstrate the existence of depositors’
reaction for excessive risk-taking, it is possible that deposit growth is influenced
by other factors. For example, there might be strong depositor confidence in the
large banks because of the possible existence of implicit guarantees such as “Too-
Big-To-Fail” (TBTF) protection. In addition, there might be aggressive marketing
strategies pursued by less risky, well capitalized and liquid banks to improve their
market shares. Or, it can be argued that by investing in new branches, personnel,
and by advertising, etc. large banks may achieve higher deposit growth without
offering higher interest rates and these findings might be interpreted as market
48
discipline10. To identify the factors that contribute to depositors’ reaction to bank
riskiness, we re-classify the banks in our sample according to their capitalization
and liquidity. We separate banks with asset more than $50 million (377 banks) into
two groups according to their capital and liquidity ratios. Banks with liquidity
and capital-to-asset ratios above the median are grouped as “Liquid and Well-
Capitalized Banks” and the other banks are called “Remaining Banks”.
Tables 2.7 and 2.8 present the estimated coefficients of deposit growth and
interest rate equations for liquid and well-capitalized banks and, the remaining
banks. According to the OLS and fixed-effect estimates, none of the risk factors
has a significant impact on the deposit growth as well as interest paid on deposits
in the sub-sample of liquid and well-capitalized banks. These banks are perceived
as unlikely to fail by the depositors. As it can be seen in Tables 2.7 and 2.8, when
the assets of the liquid and well-capitalized banks increase, growth rate of deposits
increases even though interest rates paid on deposits by these banks decline.
However, among the remaining banks, there is no indication of safety by the
depositors. In the sub-sample of less-capitalized and less-liquid banks, depositors
exercise discipline based on capitalization and liquidity. When placing funds in
less-capitalized and less-liquid banks, depositors seek banks with better capital-
ized banks. In addition, liquid banks are preferred by depositors. We observe
that interaction dummies with deposit insurance, excluding non-performing and
the total loans, are all significant. Even though size interaction dummy has the
10However, as mentioned before there is no significant change in building network of branches
in the Russian Federation during the analysis period (see Figure 2-1).
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unexpected sign, this is mostly due to large banks’ loss of market share.
Both capital and liquidity ratios are significant with positive coefficients in the
interest rate equations for under-capitalized and/or illiquid banks. Higher inter-
est rates paid by these banks even though they increase their capitalization and
liquidity can be explained by their efforts to improve their market share and to
qualify for joining the deposit insurance system starting 2004:211. Furthermore,
CBR introduced new requirements for capital and liquidity adequacy for commer-
cial banks since 2003. Banks in general anticipated that they have to improve
their balance sheets before they can join the deposit insurance system. Hence, we
do not observe any depositor discipline after the introduction of deposit insurance.
2.7 Conclusion
In this essay, we measured the extent of market discipline imposed by depositors
on the banks in the Russian Federation. Banking in the Russian Federation has
developed rapidly since the financial crisis in 1998. Since the crisis, banking in-
dustry has consolidated and improved its role in financial intermediation. A new
banking law was introduced with the intent of improving the prudential require-
ments for banks in line with Basel principles. In the meanwhile, depositors became
aware of banks’ risk-taking behavior.
In particular, we find that depositors imposed limited market discipline on
11We estimate our empirical model by dividing data before and after the introduction of
the deposit insurance system and observe that significantly higher pricing policy of the under-
capitalized and/or less-liquid banks did not continue after the insurance system started.
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bank risk-taking. Depositors change their funds in the banks based on the banks’
liquidity and capital adequacy. This result on depositor discipline is consistent
with the results from other emerging markets. Similar behavior of depositors in
emerging markets suggests that the depositors are not completely informed about
the risk-taking behavior of banks but prefer highly capitalized banks.
In addition to highly capitalized banks, depositors also prefer liquid banks for
placing their funds. Moreover, depositors find safety in larger banks that are more
liquid and well-capitalized as compared to other large banks.
Risk factors are not significant in demanding higher interest rates on deposits.
Estimations on less-capitalized and/or less-liquid large banks indicate that these
banks pursue aggressively high pricing strategies to increase their external funds.
Thus, they would be qualified to join the deposit insurance system and also satisfy
the minimum requirements of the CBR. However, it is observed that the estab-
lishment of the deposit insurance system has not yet been effective in determining
depositor behavior.
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CHAPTER 3
DEPOSITORS’ ASSESSMENT OF BANK
RISKINESS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
3.1 Introduction
Depositors’ reaction by changing the flow and price of loanable funds is expected
to restrict banks’ excessive risk-taking. This disciplining behavior by depositors
contributes to bank supervisors’ efforts in maintaining a well-functioning banking
system. By increasing the awareness of all stakeholders of banks and requir-
ing more timely and comprehensive disclosure by banks, supervisors can reduce
the potential risks of the banking industry. Major stakeholders of banks are the
shareholders, the borrowers, and the depositors. The role of these stakeholders to
discipline banks vary according to their ability to access information that proxy
risk-taking behavior of banks. For example, market prices of debt and equity con-
tracts issued by banks in the developed markets contain significant information
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on risk-taking behavior of banks.1
In most of the emerging economies, banks are either privately held or floated
shares are a very small portion of the outstanding bank shares.2 Moreover, vari-
ous financial contracts such as subordinated debentures simply do not exist. So,
the effectiveness of the market discipline is limited to depositors in most of the
emerging markets.
In this essay, we compare the effectiveness of depositors’ discipline on banks
in the Russian Federation to bank discipline in Turkey. In addition, we underline
the effects of different institutional factors and structural differences on depositor
reaction in both countries. Depositors would adjust their funds held by the banks
or banks may be compelled to increase the price of deposits when financial ratios
as indicators of risk deteriorate. The risk factors considered in the study are
standard CAMEL ratios. The estimations are controlled for institutional and
economic factors. While depositors respond in a similar manner to bank riskiness
in both countries, the measures taken by bank supervisors influence the behavior of
the depositors. For example, in Turkey we observe the disappearance of depositor
discipline after the introduction of unlimited government guarantees on all bank
deposits and liabilities. Turkish authorities chose a costly bailout of banks after
the financial crisis in 2001. The non-performing loans of the banks were replaced
by Treasury bonds. The result of this operation was to almost double the public
1See for example Flannery (1998) for a comprehensive survey on the relationship between
equity and bond prices and, bank riskiness.
2Even if the bank stocks are traded, the number of shares held by outside shareholders is usu-
ally very small. For example, the only bank stock traded in the Russian Trading System (RTS)
is the state-owned Sberbank. The shares traded form a very small portion of the outstanding
shares. Central Bank of Russia is the majority shareholder of Sberbank.
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debt-to-GDP ratio. So, the cost of the bank bailout was borne by the general
public.
On the other hand, in the Russian Federation, bank losses after the crisis
in 1998 were to a large extent paid by the depositors. The losses incurred in
the early 1990s due to high inflation and the experience of the 1998 crisis made
the Russian general public aware of the risks involved in depositing funds in the
banking system. Depositors response in withdrawing funds from Sodbizbank in
2004 was swift. Even rumors about an imminent collapse of Alfabank, the largest
private bank at the time, resulted in long lines at the bank’s branches resulting
with a liquidity shortage. The bank weathered the short-lived run by obtaining
credit in international credit markets. Costly experiences both in the Russian
Federation and Turkey should have compelled banks to improve their operations
and risk-taking in order to attract deposits.
Both countries experienced severe banking crises followed by major restruc-
turing and recovery of the banking industry.3 Comparison of market discipline
in both countries provides evidence for the development of measures to improve
control of risk taking behavior by banks.
Turkish banking industry makes a better case for comparison with the Russian
banking industry. Both countries are characterized by declining share of state-
owned banks and increasing share of private banking. Given the consolidation
activities, banking in the Russian Federation can be considered as converging to
the Turkish banking industry. However, one may want a comparison of the Russian
3Russian crisis in August 1998 and Turkish crises in November 2000 and February 2001.
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Federation with Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries but, banking
industry development has taken a completely different course in these countries. In
CEE countries, the banking industry is dominated by foreign banks. In contrast,
both Turkish and Russian banking industries are still dominated by domestic
bankers. Moreover, banking industries in both countries have undergone major
restructuring demonstrated by mergers, liquidations and improvements in capital
adequacy and management since 2000.
After the financial crisis in 1998, the Russian banking industry has undergone
significant changes both in terms of a reduction in the number of banks as well
as in establishing public confidence in the use of the banking system for financial
intermediation. Along with growing income, more savings have been channeled to
the banking industry since 1999. As of 2005, there were 1,253 banks, down from
a high of over 3,300 in 1995, distributed over a very large geography making it
difficult to supervise and monitor. In such a banking system with a large number
of banks, market discipline imposed by depositors can be useful in regulating bank
risk taking behavior. In addition, market discipline can increase competitiveness
in the banking industry as depositors reallocate funds away from risky banks.
Indeed, Russian depositors reallocate deposits either by withdrawing funds from
the banking system or depositing in the safe state-owned banks once information
becomes available about the increased riskiness of a bank. However, they have
no price influence on the banks in terms of demanding higher interest rates for
increased risks. This implies a perfectly elastic demand for funds. Banks are able
to substitute deposits with other funds.
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Similar to the Russian banking industry, Turkish banks experienced signifi-
cant consolidation after the crisis in 2001. The number of commercial banks has
dropped dramatically from 80 in 1999 to 47 in 2005. Turkey has a competitive
banking industry, offering many financial products to depositors as well as utilizing
high technology in obtaining deposits with relative ease. However, banking indus-
try was most adversely affected by the crisis in 2001. As a result, state guarantees
were increased to cover all bank liabilities to avoid bank runs and bankruptcies.
In the meanwhile, introduction of this policy marked a change in the behavior of
depositors where monitoring of banks became ineffective. After sufficient confi-
dence building measures have been established in the banking industry, guarantees
were finally reduced after 2004. During the post-crisis period when partial deposit
insurance became in effect, improvement in the capitalization and asset quality of
banks increased the depositors’ and investors’ confidence in the Turkish banking
industry. With reduced state guarantees, depositors chose well capitalized banks
for their funds.
In addition to the improvements in the financial structure of banks, we mea-
sure the performance of management to assess resource utilization by banks. To
do this, we calculate an efficiency score for each banks for each period. After
the crises, banks in both countries, improved their operations resulting in more
efficient financial intermediation. We find evidence that efficient banks were able
to increase deposits.
The essay is organized as follows. In section two, we provide a brief review
of market discipline literature in emerging markets. Banking industries in the
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Russian Federation and Turkey after 2000 are discussed in section three. The
model used in estimating depositor discipline is presented in section four. In
section five, we described the data. We discuss the estimation results and compare
depositor discipline in the Russian Federation and Turkey in section six, and we
conclude the essay in section seven.
3.2 Literature Review
Banks are the dominant financial intermediaries in emerging markets. In addition
to the opaqueness of ordinary banking activities, frequent financial crises, state
ownership of banks, and inadequate supervision necessitate close monitoring of
these institutions. Market discipline of banks refers to private stakeholders pro-
ducing information that helps supervisors in recognizing problem banks and imple-
menting corrective measures. Major stakeholder of banks are their shareholders,
borrowers, and depositors. The role of these stakeholders to discipline banks vary
substantially according to their ability to access information that proxy risk-taking
behavior of banks. For example, market prices of debt and equity contracts issued
by the banks in the developed markets contain significant information on risk-
taking behavior of banks (see Flannery 1998). However, in most of the emerging
economies, banks are either privately held or the traded shares are a small portion
of the outstanding bank shares. Caprio and Honohan (2004) provide evidence that
the ratio of listed banks’ assets to banking assets in emerging markets increase as
per capita GDP increases. They argue that equity market discipline can exist if
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the market share of the listed banks is large4. Moreover, various financial contracts
such as subordinated debentures simply do not exist. Hence, the exercise of the
market discipline is limited to certain stakeholders namely, depositors in most of
the emerging markets using limited information from the financial statements of
the banks.
Calomiris and Kahn (1991) argued that because depositors are both risk averse
and risk intolerant, they monitor their bank and take actions in order to price and
limit their risks. In particular, they showed that market discipline by depositors
is observed from the increase in the deposit rates and/or premature withdrawal
of the demandable deposits. Using mainly balance sheet data, it is hypothesized
that there is a significant relationship between deposit rates, deposit growth and
the bank riskiness.
Previous empirical studies in the emerging economies are concentrated on Latin
American economies (see Calomiris and Powell 2001 for Argentina; Barajas and
Steiner 2000 for Columbia; and Martinez-Peria and Schmukler 2001 for Argentine,
Mexico and Chile). Later, there are also evidence for Poland by Mondschean and
Opiela (1999), for India by Ghosh and Das (2003), for Turkey by Ungan and Caner
(2004) and Onder and Ozyildirim (2003) and for Russian Federation by Karas et
al. (2006) and Ungan et al. (2006).
4The only bank stock traded in the Russian Trading System (RTS) is the state-owned Sber-
bank. Moreover The Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank of Russia hold the majority of
shares.
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3.3 Banking in the Russia Federation and Turkey
We compare banking industry in the Russian Federation with Turkish banking in-
dustry in terms of relative importance of banks in the economy, aggregate financial
ratios, concentration and efficiency in the management of the banks. According
to the existing financial institutions and markets in the Russian Federation and
Turkey, it is apparent that in both countries, the banking sector dominates the
financial system. As shown in Table 3.1, the size of the transactions in the banking
sector in both countries are significantly higher than the other financial institu-
tions. As of 2005, more than 85 percent of the financial assets in both countries
were owned by the banking industry.
In both countries, state banks’ involvement in financial intermediation is sig-
nificantly high. In Turkey, even though the share of the state banks has declined
over the years, the existing three state banks have 31.4 percent of the overall bank-
ing assets as of 2005 (Table 3.2). Moreover, state banks account for 24.7 percent
of the capital and 38.8 percent of the deposits of the banking industry while they
provide only 21.0 percent of the loans. In the Russian Federation, 32 state banks
own 40.7 percent of the banking industry assets, a significantly higher proportion
than in Turkey. State banks account for 33.8 percent of the capital and 62 percent
of the deposits while providing about 46.7 percent of corporate loans. So, Russian
state-owned banks have a much bigger share of the banking industry than state
banks in Turkey. However, the trends indicate that the states’s share in banking
has been converging to its share in Turkey.
63
T
ab
le
3.
1:
F
in
an
ci
al
S
y
st
em
A
ss
et
s
(b
y
th
e
en
d
of
20
05
)
R
u
ss
ia
n
F
ed
er
at
io
n
T
u
rk
ey
N
u
m
b
er
of
N
u
m
b
er
of
F
in
an
ci
al
A
ss
et
s†
A
ss
et
s
S
h
ar
e
in
F
in
an
ci
al
A
ss
et
s†
A
ss
et
s
S
h
ar
e
in
In
st
it
u
ti
on
s
($
b
il
li
on
)
to
G
D
P
A
ss
et
s
In
st
it
u
ti
on
s
($
b
il
li
on
)
to
G
D
P
A
ss
et
s
B
an
k
in
g
S
ec
to
r
12
53
34
4.
8
45
.1
89
.3
47
29
4.
2
81
.6
85
.0
In
su
ra
n
ce
C
om
p
an
ie
s
10
75
20
.7
2.
7
5.
4
35
6.
4
1.
8
1.
9
P
ri
va
te
P
en
si
on
F
u
n
d
s
26
1
12
.2
1.
6
3.
2
11
4.
2
1.
2
1.
2
In
ve
st
m
en
t
F
u
n
d
s
36
0
8.
1
1.
1
2.
1
36
23
.8
6.
6
6.
9
O
th
er
‡
-
-
-
-
18
4
17
.6
4.
9
5.
1
T
ot
al
29
49
38
5.
8
50
.5
10
0.
0
31
3
34
6.
3
96
.1
10
0.
0
So
ur
ce
:
C
en
tr
al
B
an
k
of
R
us
si
a
an
d
B
an
ki
ng
R
eg
ul
at
io
n
an
d
Su
pe
rv
is
io
n
A
ge
nc
y
of
T
ur
ke
y.
† :
$1
.0
=
28
,2
8
R
ub
le
an
d
$1
.0
=
1,
34
95
T
ur
ki
sh
L
ir
as
by
th
e
en
d
of
20
05
.
‡ :
P
ar
ti
ci
pa
ti
on
B
an
ks
,
L
ea
si
ng
an
d
Fa
ct
or
in
g
C
om
pa
ni
es
,
Se
cu
ri
ti
es
In
te
rm
ed
ia
ry
In
st
it
ut
io
ns
an
d
C
on
su
m
er
F
in
an
ce
C
om
pa
ni
es
ar
e
in
cl
ud
ed
.
64
Both in Russian Federation and in Turkey, foreign banks’ share in terms of
assets remains below 10 percent which is far from the average in any CEE banking
industry. Overall, banking industry in both countries is characterized by declining
share of the state-owned banks and increasing share of private and foreign banks5.
Central Bank of Russia (CBR) classifies domestic private banks as large diversi-
fied banks, intra-group banks, that is, banks owned by large corporations, medium
and small size Moscow region banks and medium and small regional banks6. Di-
versified banks own about one-fourth of the banking industry assets and capital.
They are the second largest after the state-owned banks in terms of assets and
capital.
Banking industry in Russian Federation has experienced continuous growth
since 2000. Ratio of bank assets to GDP in the Russian Federation rose from 35.3
percent in 2001 to 45.1 percent in 2005 (see Table 3.3). Despite severe banking
crisis in 20017, the asset size of the Turkish banking industry was 81.6 percent of
GDP in 2005, up from 77 percent in 2002. Asset to GDP ratio in Turkey is almost
twice as much as in the Russian Federation. However, this is due to longer asset
accumulation process in Turkey relative to the Russian banking industry.
There are several structural similarities of the banking industries in the Russian
Federation and Turkey. First, the capital base of the banking industries in both of
the countries adapted international capital standards. Because of the timing of the
5In some CEE countries, foreign-owned banks constitute the whole banking industry.
6As of 2005, there are 74 diversified banks; 109 inter-group banks; 455 medium and small
size Moscow region banks; and 484 medium and small regional banks.
7The increase in 2001 can be explained by the decrease in real GDP of Turkish economy due
to 2001 financial crisis.
65
T
ab
le
3.
2:
O
w
n
er
sh
ip
S
tr
u
ct
u
re
of
R
u
ss
ia
n
an
d
T
u
rk
is
h
B
an
k
in
g
S
ec
to
rs
(b
y
th
e
en
d
of
20
05
)
R
u
ss
ia
B
an
k
in
g
S
ec
to
r
T
u
rk
is
h
B
an
k
in
g
S
ec
to
r
N
o.
of
S
h
ar
e
of
N
o.
of
S
h
ar
e
of
B
an
k
s
A
ss
et
s
C
ap
it
al
L
oa
n
s†
D
ep
os
it
s
B
an
k
s
A
ss
et
s
C
ap
it
al
L
oa
n
s
D
ep
os
it
s
S
ta
te
C
on
tr
ol
le
d
B
an
k
s
32
40
.7
33
.8
46
.7
62
.0
3
31
.4
24
.7
21
.0
38
.8
P
ri
va
te
B
an
k
s
11
70
51
.0
57
.0
45
.9
28
.4
16
59
.7
55
.7
65
.2
57
.0
F
or
ei
gn
B
an
k
s
51
8.
3
9.
2
7.
4
9.
6
14
5.
2
6.
1
9.
9
4.
1
O
th
er
B
an
k
s‡
-
-
-
-
-
14
3.
7
13
.5
3.
9
0.
1
T
ot
al
12
53
10
0.
0
10
0.
0
10
0.
0
10
0.
0
47
10
0.
0
10
0.
0
10
0.
0
10
0.
0
So
ur
ce
:
C
en
tr
al
B
an
k
of
R
us
si
a,
B
an
ki
ng
R
eg
ul
at
io
n
an
d
Su
pe
rv
is
io
n
A
ge
nc
y
of
T
ur
ke
y
an
d
T
he
B
an
ks
A
ss
oc
ia
ti
on
of
T
ur
ke
y.
† :
O
nl
y
co
rp
or
at
e
lo
an
s
fo
r
R
us
si
an
Fe
de
ra
ti
on
.
‡ :
O
th
er
ba
nk
s
in
T
ur
ke
y
in
cl
ud
e
th
e
ba
nk
co
nt
ro
lle
d
by
St
at
e
D
ep
os
it
In
su
ra
nc
e
Fu
nd
an
d
th
e
in
ve
st
m
en
t
an
d
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t
ba
nk
s.
66
T
ab
le
3.
3:
R
u
ss
ia
n
an
d
T
u
rk
is
h
B
an
k
in
g
S
ec
to
rs
(2
00
1-
20
05
)
R
u
ss
ia
B
an
k
in
g
In
d
u
st
ry
T
u
rk
is
h
B
an
k
in
g
In
d
u
st
ry
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
G
D
P
($
b
il
li
on
)
30
6.
6
34
5.
5
43
1.
7
58
8.
9
76
3.
7
12
2.
6
16
7.
4
25
4.
3
31
8.
0
36
0.
4
T
ot
al
A
ss
et
s
($
b
il
li
on
)
10
8.
3
13
2.
2
18
2.
6
24
7.
7
34
4.
8
11
7.
5
12
9.
5
17
8.
0
22
7.
2
29
4.
2
S
h
a
re
o
f
G
D
P
(%
)
A
ss
et
s
35
.3
38
.3
42
.3
42
.1
45
.1
95
.9
77
.3
70
.0
71
.4
81
.6
C
ap
it
al
5.
1
5.
4
6.
2
5.
6
5.
7
8.
6
9.
3
10
.0
10
.7
11
.0
L
oa
n
s
14
.8
16
.6
20
.3
22
.9
25
.3
21
.0
17
.8
18
.6
23
.2
30
.8
D
ep
os
it
s
7.
6
9.
5
11
.5
11
.7
12
.8
66
.1
50
.2
43
.5
44
.6
50
.0
S
h
a
re
o
f
A
ss
e
ts
(%
)
C
ap
it
al
14
.4
14
.0
14
.6
13
.3
12
.7
9.
0
12
.1
14
.2
15
.0
13
.5
L
oa
n
s
41
.9
43
.3
47
.9
54
.5
55
.9
21
.9
23
.0
26
.5
32
.4
37
.8
D
ep
os
it
s
21
.5
24
.8
27
.1
27
.7
28
.3
68
.9
64
.9
62
.2
62
.4
61
.2
So
ur
ce
:
T
he
ra
ti
os
fo
r
th
e
R
us
si
an
Fe
de
ra
ti
on
ar
e
ob
ta
in
ed
fr
om
th
e
B
an
ki
ng
Su
pe
rv
is
io
n
R
ep
or
t,
C
en
tr
al
B
an
k
of
R
us
si
a
(2
00
6)
.
67
crises in both of the countries, banks in the Russian Federation had strengthened
their capital base three years before the banks in Turkey did. Secondly, in both of
the countries, number of banks with good credit ratings has increased. As a result,
these banks can easily raise funds from the international interbank market. Finally,
in both of the countries, consumer credits are the fastest growing credit category
due to the demand from the consumers, although the demand for commercial
credits is strong in both of the countries.
On the other hand, there is a couple of differences in the deposit and loan
structures of the Russian Federation and Turkey. The volume of deposits in Turkey
is more than the volume of credits. By the end of 2005, only 62 percent of the
deposits is channeled as credits. In contrast, the volume of credits in the Russian
Federation is the twice of the volume of deposits. Secondly, share of deposits in the
liabilities of Russian banks is far less than the share of deposits in the liabilities of
Turkish banks. However, share of deposits in the Russian Federation is increasing
while it has reached a saturation in Turkey.
According to CBR (2006), the banking industry in the Russian Federation is
highly concentrated. Sberbank accounts for 28.6 percent of all banking industry
assets and 33 percent of total equity in the banking industry. In 2005, the top ten
banks’ share in terms of assets in banking industry is 53.5 percent (see Table 3.4).
These banks account for 69 percent of the deposits and provide 57.7 percent of
the loans of the Russian banking industry.
The biggest bank in Turkey is a privately owned bank, Is Bank. State owns
the second biggest bank in Turkey. These two banks accounts for 29.4 percent of
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Table 3.4: Russian and Turkish Banking Sector Concentration Levels (2002-2005)
Russian Banking Sector Turkish Banking Sector
2002 2003 2004 2005 2002 2003 2004 2005
Assets (%)
Top 5 Banks 44.7 43.7 45.2 45.4 58.4 60.3 59.5 63.0
Top 10 Banks 54.6 53.2 53.5 53.5 80.8 82.3 84.0 85.0
Loans (%)
Top 5 Banks 48.8 46.5 49.2 50.2 56.3 54.7 54.1 56.3
Top 10 Banks 58.0 54.5 57.1 57.7 77.0 76.8 79.0 81.0
Deposits (%)
Top 5 Banks 64.4 62.4 63.6 59.8 62.2 63.0 64.9 66.1
Top 10 Banks 73.1 70.5 70.0 69.0 86.5 86.6 89.6 89.8
Source: Central Bank of Russia and The Bank Association of Turkey.
the assets of the industry. The top 10 banks control 84.1 percent of the assets and
they provide 80.9 percent of the loans. Moreover 89.1 percent of the deposits are
placed in the top 10 banks8.
Banking industry in both countries experienced improved management after
restructuring and consolidation following the crises. Estimated efficiency scores
in both countries demonstrate the effects of better use of bank resources. In
Table 3.5, bank efficiencies according to size and ownership in the Russian Fed-
eration and in Turkey are presented. The efficiency scores are calculated using
the stochastic frontier approach. Calculation of efficiency scores are explained
in the Appendix A (for further analysis of bank efficiency, see Caner and Kon-
torovich 2004). The operating efficiencies show some similarities between the two
8According to Table 3.4, concentration levels in Turkey seem to be higher as compared to
the levels in the Russian Federation. However, it should be noticed that top 10 banks in Turkey
account for 21 percent of all banks whereas in the Russian Federation, top 10 banks account for
0.8 percent of all banks.
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Table 3.5: Mean Operating Efficiencies of Russian and Turkish Banks
Russian Federation Turkey
All Big State- All State-
Banks Banks† Foreign Private Owned Banks Foreign Private Owned
2000 0.459 0.518 0.503 0.498 0.455 0.379 0.369 0.429 0.258
2001 0.414 0.490 0.445 0.424 0.411 0.409 0.489 0.358 0.471
2002 0.428 0.508 0.439 0.385 0.430 0.479 0.544 0.490 0.324
2003 0.459 0.478 0.432 0.365 0.464 0.623 0.753 0.641 0.437
2004 0.444 0.523 0.445 0.388 0.446 0.517 0.536 0.581 0.380
2005 0.463 0.524 0.432 0.397 0.466 0.525 0.450 0.597 0.353
† Banks with asset size above $50 million.
countries. The efficiency scores are significantly higher for Turkey than in the
Russian Federation since it has a more competitive banking industry. However,
especially in 2004 and 2005 efficiency scores of large banks in the Russian Fed-
eration are very similar to the aggregate Turkish banking industry. We observe
an overall improvement in the bank efficiency in both countries during the period
under consideration. However, there are still notable differences in terms of oper-
ating efficiency levels if banks are categorized according to their ownership status.
The most efficient cluster in the Russian Federation is state-owned banks while
privately-owned Turkish banks are the most efficient group in Turkey. Efficiency
loss in Turkey in 2004 is due to investments in employees and other resources by
banks in order to increase their retail business.
3.4 Empirical Model
We have several questions in this essay. First, did market discipline exist in the
Russian Federation and Turkey; that is, did the preceding bank specific risk factors
significantly explain the change in bank deposits and interest rates on deposits?
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Secondly, what were the bank specific risk factors that cause the difference of the
extent of market discipline in the Russian Federation and Turkey? Thirdly, what
were the effects of the full deposit insurance in Turkey? Fourthly, did the market
discipline change significantly after the introduction of limited deposit insurance
in the Russian Federation? Finally, while controlling for bank risk variables and
other factors, did bank ownership structure, and operational efficiency of banks
affect the change in deposits and the interest rates?
In order to examine depositor behavior, we estimate two sets of model, one for
the change in deposits and one for the interest rates for each country. Therefore,
we have a vector of variables such that Zj = [Z1, Z2], where Z1 is the change in
deposits and Z2 is the interest rate. In each model for each country, we test whether
bank specific risk factors, macroeconomic factors, bank ownership structure and
deposit insurance significantly affect the behavior of depositors. In the tests of the
existence of depositor discipline in Russian Federation during the period 2000:1 to
2005:1, and in Turkey during 1997:4 to 2006:3, we estimate the following reduced
form model using quarterly data:
Zij,t = αj +
2∑
j=1
βjZ
i
j,(t−1) +
5∑
k=1
φj,k Risk
i
k,(t−1) +
2∑
p=1
γj,p Macrop,(t−1)
+
3∑
q=1
δj,q Bank
i
q,t +
2∑
l=1
ψj,l Size
i
l,(t−1) + ui,t (3.1)
such that i = 1, . . . N , t = 1, . . . T , j = 1, 2. N is the number of banks in each
country, T is the number of observations per bank that varies across institutions
and countries due to the unbalanced panel and ui,t is the error term. Z
i
1,t is the
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percentage change in the deposits, and Zi2,t is the implicit deposit interest rate.
They both measure depositors’ assessment of bank riskiness for bank i at time t.
Zi2,t is calculated as the ratio of interest expense to total deposits in the previous
period. Theoretically, marginal rates indicate the sensitivity of interest rates on
deposits to change in bank riskiness. However, as the marginal interest rates
are not available for both of the countries, we use the average interest rates on
deposits in this essay, similar to other studies on market discipline in emerging
markets (see Martinez-Peria and Schmukler 2001; and Mondschean and Opiela
1999). The lagged values of the dependent variables are added to the right hand
side in order to account for the simultaneity of the growth in deposits and the
implicit interest rates.
(Riskik,t) represents the five factors are included in the estimations as the
sources of risk after controlling for other factors such as macroeconomic fluc-
tuations that affect bank balance sheets. The proxies for bank riskiness are the
following financial ratios: non-performing loans-to-assets, loans-to-assets, capital-
to-assets, net profit after tax-to-assets and liquid assets-to-assets. Macroeconomic
impacts (Macrop,t), are controlled by changes in the consumer price index (CPI)
and the dollar-ruble exchange rate for the Russian Federation. We only control
changes in the wholesale price index (WPI) for Turkey. Other than bank risk
indicators, we control various bank characteristics that might affect the growth in
deposits and implicit interest rates. (Bankiq,t), is described by three variables: two
dummy variables that account for the state and foreign ownership and a variable
to control operational efficiency of the banks. These variables are incorporated to
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the model for the sake of controlling institutional strategies of banks on deposit
growth and interest rates. (Sizeil,t), size of the bank is characterized by two vari-
ables: natural logarithm of asset size of a bank and the relative size of the bank’s
total deposits in its total funding base. The bank’s total funding base includes
deposits, interbank loans and long-term debt. Finally, two different time dummy
variables, DIDummyt and Crisist, are introduced into the empirical model for
Turkey in order to control the impact of full insurance periods and crisis periods
on deposit market. During 1997:4-2004:2, all of the household deposits are fully
covered by the government sponsored insurance system in Turkey. Hence, dummy
variable for partial insurance period (2004:3-2006:3) equals to one otherwise it is
zero. Another time dummy is used for controlling the effect of recent financial
crisis in Turkey during the period 2000:4-2001:2. It is hypothesized that financial
market investors including the depositors in Turkey might have acted different
than they did during the normal periods of the economy.
3.5 Data
For the Russian Federation, quarterly bank-level data is obtained from data ser-
vices provider Mobile Information Services and covers the period from the first
quarter of 2000 to the first quarter of 2005. The data for Turkish banking in-
dustry is provided by Banking Association of Turkey and covers the period from
1997:4 to 2006:39.
9In Turkey, periods covered for the analysis depend on the electronic availability of the data
set.
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To test the depositors’ assessment in the Russian Federation against risk-taking
behavior by banks, we use the data after 1999 excluding the crisis year of 1998
and its aftermath. The 2000-2005 period is a financially stable period for the Rus-
sian financial markets and the quality of the financial statements are substantially
better compared to prior years. The size of the assets of the banks in the Russian
Federation varies from $2 billion for the largest bank to less than $10,000. Often,
depositors of the small banks are either the owners, a large firm or local admin-
istrations. Hence, the possibility that external depositors may have any influence
on bank risk-taking by small banks is very unlikely. Therefore, we consider only
banks with assets greater than $50 million. During the period 2000-2005, there
are 377 banks in the Russian Federation with asset size greater than $50 million.
These banks account for about 95 percent of the total assets and loans, 96 per-
cent of total deposits and 90 percent of the total capital of the banking industry
(CBR, 2006). Eleven of the 377 banks are excluded from the data set because of
insufficient number of consecutive financial information during the analysis period.
For the sample of Turkish banks 41 out of the 47 are used to test the depositors’
reaction to bank risk-taking. Six banks were excluded due to insufficient data.
Nevertheless, banks included account for more than 96 percent of the total assets
and loans, 99.99 percent of total deposits and 87 percent of total capital.
In Table 3.6, summary statistics for the dependent and independent variables
used in the empirical model are presented. In order to simplify the comparison
among Russian Federation and Turkey, the mean and standard deviation of each
variable are calculated over the period between 2000-2005. In the Russian Feder-
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Table 3.6: Descriptive Statistics (2000:1-2005:1)
Russian Banking Turkish Banking
Industry† Industry
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
Dependent Variables
Growth in Deposits 0.1665 0.6584 0.0385 0.5893
Implicit Interest Rate 0.1347 1.1563 0.3294 0.5910
Independent Variables
Non-Performing Loans/Assets 0.0014 0.0072 0.0095 0.0210
Total Loans/Assets 0.3580 0.1908 0.2713 0.2531
Total Capital/Assets 0.2218 0.1598 0.1534 0.1633
Net Profit After Tax/Assets 0.0222 0.0325 0.0047 0.1291
Liquid Assets/Assets 0.4423 0.2691 0.2747 0.1884
Size Variables
Assets (in natural logarithm) 21.3515 1.5612 20.4512 2.0314
Total Deposits/Total Funding Base 0.9154 0.2106 0.6983 0.2578
Operating Efficiency 0.5042 0.1812 0.4500 0.2848
Macroeconomic Variables
Change in Price Index (Quarterly) 0.0361 0.0160 0.0720 0.0593
Change in FX -0.0014 0.0252
†Includes banks with asset size above $50 million.
ation, deposit market is rather small considering the size of the Russian economy.
Hence, the growth in the deposits market is significantly higher in the Russian Fed-
eration than in Turkey. More precisely, the growth rate of deposits in the Russian
Federation is almost four times more than the rate in Turkey during 2000-2005.
Note also that during the sample period, interest rates on deposits in Turkey are
twice as high as the interest rates in the Russian Federation, i.e., on average, 13.47
percent in the Russian Federation and 32.94 percent in Turkey. One can observe
that there are several similarities in the summary statistics of the two countries.
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On average, banks are highly capitalized, liquid and utilizes deposits as a major
source of funds10. Moreover, standard deviations of the bank related variables
including bank risk measures are very high in both economies suggesting significant
differences among banks. Furthermore, operating efficiencies of the banks in the
Russian Federation and Turkey are, on average, similar in the sense that there
need to be further improvements for both countries.
3.6 Empirical Results
We estimate fixed-effects regressions using cross-sectional time series data to mea-
sure the extent of the reaction of depositors to bank risk-taking by the Russian and
the Turkish banks. Estimated coefficients of the deposit growth equation and the
interest rate equation are included in Tables 3.7 and 3.8 respectively. Columns 1-
3 have the estimated coefficients for the Russian Federation while coefficients for
Turkish banks are included in columns 4-6. The models given in columns 2 and
6, are slightly different because there are few efficient foreign-owned banks in
the Russian Federation, few foreign-owned banks in Turkey during 1997:4-2002:1,
and few state-owned banks in Turkey during 1997:4-2006:3, we excluded some
of the ownership dummies in the fixed-effects regressions, when necessary. Esti-
mated coefficients using the full sample of banks in both countries are shown in
columns 1 and 4 in Tables 3.7 and 3.8. Sub-sample estimates are provided to test
10CBR introduced new regulations to improve reporting by banks. Since 2004, CBR requires
the new methodology to be used in the calculation of capital and liquidity adequacy ratios.
Hence, there are slight differences between the calculation of capitalization and liquidity ratios
in both countries.
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the robustness of the model as well as providing clearer understanding of effects of
depositor response to different types of banks. In particular, banks in the Russian
Federation have been split according to operating efficiencies in the loan market.
Furthermore, depositors’ behavior in Turkey is analyzed over two subperiods to
differentiate disciplining behavior before and after the crisis. Thus, for the Rus-
sian Federation in columns 2-3, we report the estimated coefficients for the banks
above and below 75 percentile in terms of operating efficiency respectively. 75
percentile in efficiency of Russian banks corresponds to the average efficiency of
the Turkish banks. In columns 5-6, we present the empirical results using Turkish
banking data for equal subperiods: 1997:4-2002:1 and 2002:2-2006:3.
Considering all banks in the Russian Federation and in Turkey (columns 1
and 4), we observe that there is a significant slowdown in the deposit growth
of banks if the deposit accumulation rate was high in the previous period. More
precisely, if banks’ deposits grew by 10 percent in the previous quarter, the current
deposits would decline by 2.36 percent in the Russian Federation and 2.78 percent
in Turkey. Moreover, if banks operating in the Russian Federation offered higher
interest rates in the previous period then, funds deposited in these banks increase
significantly, suggesting that depositors respond positively to higher interest rates
offered by these banks. In particular, efficient banks in the Russian Federation
(column 2 of Table 3.7) achieved highest growth by increasing previous period
interest rate on deposit. The similar behavior of depositors in Turkey is observed
only in the second subperiod. Since implicit interest rates on deposits during
the first subperiod are extremely high (mean interest rate is 30.5 percent with
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standard deviation of 63.9 percent) in Turkey, deposit growth is found to be less
responsive to an increase in interest rates.
As it can be observed in column 1 of Table 3.7, Russian depositors prefer more
liquid and more capitalized banks suggesting that there is significant market reac-
tion to discipline banks. Moreover, even though it is weakly significant, the decline
in the deposit growth of banks is 1.31 percent at the current period if banks have
already increased their loans-to-asset ratio by 10 percent. This result suggests
that increasing loan portfolios increases the credit risk of a bank, hence deposi-
tors in the Russian Federation withdraw their funds from these banks. However,
increasing non-performing loans and profitability of banks have no significant im-
pact on the growth of deposits. Deposit growth in most efficient banks (above
75 percentile) depends significantly on higher capital-to-asset ratio while deposit
growth rate of less efficient banks (below 75 percentile) depends on both higher
capital-to-asset and higher liquid assets-to-asset ratios. This evidence is consistent
with the view that liquidity is an important factor enabling banks to buffer their
lending activity against adverse shocks.
Columns 4-6 in Table 3.7, include coefficients of the deposit growth equation
estimated for Turkey. First, there is no apparent reaction of the Turkish depositors
to risk factors of the banks for the full sample period between 1997:3 and 2006:3
(fourth column in Table 3.7). The only significant risk variable, liquid assets-
to-assets ratio has a negative sign related to deposit growth contrary to what is
expected. However, in the case of Turkey, a negative value for this coefficient
may imply depositor discipline. Because, Turkish banks have long kept liquid
80
assets in the form of government securities. But, given the persistent high interest
rates on deposits until 2004, banks financed high-yield government securities with
borrowed funds from abroad. This meant high exchange rate risk for the banks.
So, contrary to the sign of the coefficient of liquid assets in the Russian Federation
equation, an increase in liquid assets may reduce the deposits held at banks in
Turkey.
In columns 5-6 of Table 3.7, Turkish data is split into subperiods. We observe
that during the two subperiods, banks with higher capital-to-asset ratios are able
to increase growth in deposits. Moreover, in the second subperiod in which banking
system have been restructured after financial crisis in 2001, depositors’ significant
reaction against risk-taking is more apparent. In particular, we find that deposit
growth significantly declines for banks with too much loans as a share of assets.
Since loans-to-asset ratio is used as proxy for exposure to credit risk, similar to the
depositors in the Russian Federation, increasing loan portfolio of Turkish banks is
perceived as high risk for those banks.
Overall, there is significant negative reaction by depositors in response to bank
risk-taking suggesting disciplinary efforts of the market in both countries. How-
ever, when we consider effects of various other bank characteristics on deposit
growth, there are notable differences in each market. First, efficient banks in the
Russian Federation have been able to increase their deposits significantly. However
loan efficiency has no effect on the deposit growth rate in Turkey. As mentioned
before, deposits are still growing in the Russian Federation whereas slightly de-
clining in Turkey (see Table 3.3). Hence, increasing operating efficiency in the
81
loans market results in depositors to recognize the success of the bank manage-
ment and invest in those efficient banks. Moreover, banks in the top 25 percentile
in terms of efficiency (column 2 of Table 3.7) with higher assets also experience
higher deposits controlling for bank risk measures and macroeconomic conditions.
In the Russian Federation, state-owned banks especially the more efficient ones
achieved higher growth in deposits during the analysis period. This result suggests
that since depositors’ risk is already covered by the government, they achieved
significant and positive growth during the analysis period. On the other hand,
foreign-owned banks are still having trouble in attracting depositors’ savings.
In the banking literature, the possibility of bailing-out of banks by regulatory
agencies is referred to as a “Too-Big-To-Fail” (TBTF) policy. In general, a bank
tends to become larger and riskier if its uninsured creditors believe that they will
benefit from TBTF coverage. In the Russian Federation, significant growth in
deposits of most efficient banks as their assets increase suggests depositors’ pref-
erence for larger and efficient banks (e.g., state-owned banks) due to the possible
protection by TBTF policy. Contrary to the evidence in the Russian Federation,
banks’ increasing asset size in Turkey resulted in declining deposits. This relation
is found to be more strong during the first subperiod: 1997:4-2002:1 in which
all deposits in Turkey are fully insured. Comprehensive insurance on deposits in
Turkey during 1997:4-2004:2 provided coverage for all bank deposits and debts.
Thus, depositors in Turkey perceived that full insurance by the government was
a stronger coverage than the implicit guarantee offered by a TBTF policy. Turk-
ish depositors shift to TBTF policy when partial insurance became effective in
82
2004. This behavior demonstrates the positive relationship between assets and
deposit growth during the 2002:2-2006:3 period. There is one similarity in the
deposit markets where banks in the Russian Federation and Turkey prefer to limit
deposits as a funding source if the share of deposits in total funding base has
increased in the previous period.
Table 3.8 includes the estimation results of price discipline equations where the
dependent variable is implicit interest rate on deposits. The estimated coefficients
of risk factors measure the ability of the depositors to demand higher interest
rates when a bank’s riskiness increases. We observe that implicit interest rates
predictably decline in both Russian Federation and Turkey when deposit growth
accelerates. Interest rates increased on deposits are followed by higher interest
rate in the next period.
The only significant bank discipline variable both in Russian Federation and
Turkey is the ratio of loans to assets. However, in the Russian Federation, esti-
mation presented in column 1 the ratio does not have the expected sign. Russian
depositors are not able to demand higher interest rates on deposits when their
banks increase the size of their loan portfolio relative to total assets. This may
be attributable to the small size of deposits available to the banks in the Rus-
sian Federation. Thus, banks are able to keep their interest costs low (see also
Ungan, et al. 2007). However, in Turkey the opposite is true. As it is shown
in column 6 in Table 3.8, in the post-crisis period, depositors demand higher in-
terest rates when the loans of the banks increase faster than total assets. So,
depositors start to impose discipline when the deposit insurance is limited. In the
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first sub-period, when the depositors enjoyed excessive insurance on deposits the
increasing loans is not considered as a risk factor. One can conclude that there is
no depositor discipline in the Russian Federation by means of demanding higher
interest rates for increased risk while in Turkey limited price discipline exists when
deposit insurance is limited.
According to estimation results in Table 3.8, other bank characteristics also
influence interest paid on deposits. Banks in the Russian Federation and in the
second subperiod all banks in Turkey, decrease interest rate on deposits as the
assets of a bank increase. That is, depositors lose the leverage to demand higher
compensation for deposits as size of banks increases. Less efficient Russian banks
benefit from TBTF policies. They reduce interest paid on deposits as they grow
in size (see third column of Table 3.8). This is also true for Turkish banks in
the second subperiod. Since household depositors are fully insured in the first
subperiod, even large banks pay higher interest rate to compete with other banks.
However, in the second subperiod, large banks pay less interest rate on deposits
suggesting TBTF policy in Turkey (see sixth column of Table 3.8).
Efficient banks, in the Russian Federation and all banks in Turkey after 2002,
paid less interest on deposits, while increasing share of funding by deposits. For
example, in the Russian Federation mean implicit interest paid by banks above 75
percentile is 7.77% as compared to 14.77% paid by less efficient banks.
One year after the crisis, interest rates started to decline in Turkey. Introduc-
tion of limited deposit insurance corresponds with the decline in interest rates.
Therefore, the negative sign of the limited deposit insurance coefficient indicates
86
a time effect rather than the effect of a reduction in deposit insurance.
Bank ownership has no effect on implicit interest paid on deposits both in
the Russian Federation and Turkey. Neither foreign banks nor state banks have
competitive advantage over other banks in both countries. This may indicate
increased competition in the banking industry. Depositors do not differentiate
banks in terms of interest rates based on ownership.
3.7 Conclusion
Depositor discipline of banks serves as an important tool for limiting risk-taking
by banks thus avoiding large bank losses as experienced in the Russian Federa-
tion in 1998 and Turkey in 2001. We test for the existence of depositor discipline
and its implementation in the Russian Federation and Turkey. Russian banking
industry and households have been experiencing major changes in financial inter-
mediation as the economy transforms into a more market-based economy. In the
Russian Federation depositors suffered large losses after the crisis in 1998 while in
Turkey depositors as well as other creditors were fully protected from incurring in
during the banking crisis in 2001. So, do we observe difference in the behavior of
depositors after such experience?
Depositors can do one or a combination of two things when faced with exces-
sive risk-taking by banks. They can withdraw their funds placed in the banks or
demand higher interest rates when the banks’ risk factor increase. We do see evi-
dence of depositors discipline both in the Russian Federation and in Turkey. But
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the discipline imposed by depositors is mostly by means of adjusting the quan-
tity of funds kept in banks as deposits. The significant factors that determine the
change in the flow of deposits is the capital adequacy of banks both in the Russian
Federation and Turkey. Liquidity is also important in determining the deposits
held in banks. But, here the depositors demonstrate different behavior in Russian
Federation and Turkey. While depositors increase funds in liquid banks in the
Russian Federation, liquidity is not perceived as low risk in Turkey because banks
may be funding liquid assets with international funds which includes exchange
rate risk. Depositors are also averse to increased lending by banks. They respond
by reducing deposits held at banks when there is an increase in lending suggesting
increasing perceived credit risk.
However, there is no evidence of price discipline by depositors on banks in the
Russian Federation. This may be attributable to the overall small size of deposits
available to banks. Also, Russian banking industry includes a significant share of
intra-group banks related to major corporations where the parent company and
affiliates are the major depositors. In Turkey, limited price discipline is observed
on banks that increase the share of loans portfolio in assets.
Separating the banks based on efficiency scores in the Russian Federation re-
veals that depositors are able to differentiate between good banks and poor banks.
Depositors are willing to accept lower interest income by placing in more efficient
banks. Less efficient banks try to take advantage of size. By growing they are
able to pay lower interest rates.
Depositor discipline both in the Russian Federation and in Turkey is influenced
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by non-risk factors. Market development, supervisory agencies, types of banks and
types of depositors all affect depositors’ influence on banks. For example, in the
Russian Federation, depositors still remember the effects of loss of wealth in the
early 1990s and the 1998 crisis. They are cautious in placing savings in the banking
system. In Turkey banks operate in a more level field but the guarantees provided
by the bank supervisors reduce the role of market forces in limiting bank risk-
taking behavior. In the Russian Federation, the dominance of state-owned banks
provides an implicit protection. So, deposits tend to concentrate in state-owned
banks.
The existence of depositor discipline in the Russian Federation is encouraging
in terms of controlling risk-taking behavior of banks. However, one should not
ignore the role of CBR in improving the fundamentals in the banking industry.
CBR has introduced stringent regulations in terms of accounting standards, and
new norms on capital adequacy, liquidity and foreign exchange risks as well as
limits on related party lending since 2001. Similar changes occurred in Turkey. The
Bank Regulatory and Supervisory Agency was first established in 2000. The weak
supervision exercised initially was replaced by improved supervision supported by
a new banking law. Strict reporting requirements and frequent bank examinations
by the Agency as well as independent examiners improved the fundamental of the
banks and limited excessive risk-taking.
However, there is still much to be learned about the changes in the Russian
and Turkish banking industry. For example, further research on depositor disci-
pline in the Russian Federation is needed on the different banking groups such as
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the regional banks, intra-group banks etc. Additionally, diversified banks deserve
special attention since they may be instrumental in improving financial intermedi-
ation in the Russian Federation. Finally, both the Russian Federation and Turkey
are experiencing increased share of foreign banks. The effects of foreign bank
participation on depositors would be a further area of research for both countries.
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CHAPTER 4
OWNER-MANAGER RESPONSES TO
OUTSIDE SHAREHOLDERS’ BANK RISK
MONITORING
4.1 Introduction
Soundness of the banks is considered to be a necessary condition for the stability
of the economic system. Moreover, safety of the individual banks and the banking
system as a whole is crucial for the continuity of the credit markets. However,
banks are exposed to external economic shocks more than the other industries.
The extent of bank risk is further complicated because of agency problems among
the shareholders, depositors and managers. So, it is in the best interest of both
the regulators and the other participants in the economy to limit the excessive
risk taking behavior of bank management.
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In addition to the regulatory discipline, it is commonly accepted that risk
taking by banks can be significantly limited if they issue sufficient amounts of
publicly-tradable securities. Investors can assess the extent of riskiness by valuing
the marketable securities issued by the banks. Subordinated debt issued by the
banks is one of the well-known instruments of the publicly-tradable securities that
the market valuation of bank riskiness is made possible. Flannery and Sorescu
(1996) show that removal of government guarantees improves risk assessment by
the holders of subordinated bank debt.
However, issuance of additional debt increases the default probability of the
banks. Further, the relation between yield on subordinated debt and bank risk is
not constant. A study by the Federal Reserve (1999) found that subordinated debt
can explain risk only in times when the banking industry is in distress. In addition
to the above-mentioned limitations, it should be emphasized that subordinated
debt issuance is not for all banking industries. It depends on the availability of
investors, the economic conditions of the country such as inflation or the overall
riskiness of the economy manifested in high real interest rates. It may not have
a market or it may be too costly for the bank. In the absence of subordinated
debt, share prices of publicly-traded banks can be used by investors to impose
market discipline on banks. Stock price data often is more easily available than
bond prices in many cases. According to Flannery et. al. (2004), stock prices of
publicly-traded banks are efficient indicators of bank riskiness.
In this essay, we measure the market disciplining of banks in terms of the
response of the shareholders to risks incurred by the banks and the extent of
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influence of different types of shareholders on management to limit risk-taking.
In particular, we examine the risk monitoring by different types of shareholders.
Differences exist in the ways portfolio investors and owner-managers monitor bank
risk taking. We find that while owner-managers respond to total equity risks and
individual risks, diversified shareholders consider portfolio risks. In addition, we
measure the effectiveness of the shareholders’ risk measures in influencing the
management to reduce the riskiness of the bank’s balance sheet.
Measuring shareholder market discipline on the Turkish banking industry pro-
vides a good test of the extent and the effectiveness of monitoring and influence by
shareholders. First, the period considered is marked by high interest rate volatility,
high inflation and low liquidity. So, one can observe the reaction of shareholders
to risk under extreme economic conditions. Second, the period studied includes
episodes of comprehensive guarantees on deposits. Also, the banking industry
does not issue any subordinated debentures and notes. So, any evidence of mar-
ket discipline can be attributed to shareholders. Third, there is a large volume of
bank stocks traded at the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE). Bank stocks account for
about one-third of the trading volume in ISE. Also, publicly traded banks account
for about one-half of the banking industry’s assets. Forth, ownership structure
is a determining factor in monitoring bank risk-taking behavior. Shareholders
are sensitive to different measures of risk. Shareholders who own bank shares as
part of a portfolio are concerned about market risk and would not mind banks
taking excessive risk. However, for owner-managers total equity risk is relevant.
In this regard Turkish banking industry provides an interesting case. Because,
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some of the majority owners of banks are not necessarily motivated by returns.
For example, a political party is a large shareholder in one of the largest private
banks. In another publicly traded bank, government is the largest shareholder.
Employees’ pension funds also own significant portion of bank shares. Given such
institutional differences, we find that owner-managers play an important role in
limiting risk-taking behavior by banks.
Section two provides a brief summary of the related literature on market disci-
pline. In section three we describe the characteristics and the developments in the
Turkish banking industry. Section four discusses the model and the data used in
estimating monitoring and influencing of banks by shareholders. We explain and
interpret the estimation results in section five. The essay concludes with section
six.
4.2 Literature Review
Lane (1993), in his seminal work defines market discipline in the context of fi-
nancial markets as “financial markets providing signals that lead borrowers (i.e.
banks) to behave in a manner consistent with their solvency”. This definition
leads to the two components of market discipline defined by Bliss and Flannery
(2002): “Monitoring” and “Influence”. Shareholders are one of the key monitors
in addition to regulators, depositors and creditors. So, shareholders would use
all the available financial information about a bank to assess its risk taking be-
havior. Monitoring by shareholders would result in changes in the equity prices
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and required rates of return of banks. In addition, market discipline implies that
management observe the change in the market valuation of the bank and respond
to market signals by the shareholders. Influencing by shareholders would result in
alterations in the composition of the balance sheet.
Extensive evidence supports the hypothesis that markets can effectively mon-
itor a firm’s true financial condition. Early research that stock prices provide
informative signals about bank risk taking concentrates on the idea of contempo-
raneous relationship between stock prices and the financial statements of the banks
(Gilbert, 1990; Flannery, 1998; Bliss and Flannery, 2002). However, an increase
in stock prices does not always indicate an increase in the safety of a bank. It may
be a result of an increase in the portfolio risk, which corresponds to an increase
in the failure probability. Therefore, in later studies, equity market indicators
other than price and return were considered in the analysis of market discipline.
For example, using total risk, portfolio beta and idiosyncratic risk assessments
for Bank Holding Companies (BHC), Hall et al. (2002b), show that sharehold-
ers value credit risk about the same as the regulators. However, they respond
less elastically to liquidity, interest rate, and leverage risk. Recently, Krainer and
Lopez (2004) and Nikolova (2003) and Gropp et al. (2006) combine equity and
debt market indicators by constructing implied asset volatility estimates of banks.
They show that combined indicators outperform the models using either set of
indicators in explaining bank risks.
Market based risk assessment of banks are also affected by the factors other
than risk measures based on financial statements. For example Konishi and Ya-
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suda (2004) examine empirically the determinants of risk taking at commercial
banks in Japan. Their findings support that increase in equity and bank fran-
chise value reduces market based indicators. Moreover they show that ownership
of banks by stable shareholders who do not engage in short term stock trading
is negatively associated to market based risk assessments. Sullivan and Spong
(2007) show that banks, where the shareholders and managers have a substantial
portion of their wealth at risk are the most likely to be operated in a safe and
sound manner. In the European banking context Baele et al. (2007) calculate
market based risk measures such as bank franchise value, systematic and idiosyn-
cratic components of risk. They show that bank franchise value increases with
the increase in the diversity of returns and equity. Similarly diversification of rev-
enue streams has a positive effect on the systematic risk while its effect on the
idiosyncratic component of risk is negative. They conclude that investors that are
able to diversify consider the systematic risk and they have the classic risk and
return trade-off problem while shareholders, borrowers and regulators which are
interested in idiosyncratic risk benefit from the reduced bank-specific risk due to
diversification.
Whereas market participants’ ability to monitor bank risks has been studied
vastly, research on the ability to influence is rare. Bliss and Flannery (2002)
study bondholder and stockholder influence on managerial actions. Although they
identify patterns consistent with beneficial market influences, they have no strong
evidence for managerial influence. Nier and Baumann (2006) show that market
discipline is influential on for banks to limit their risk of default by holding capital
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buffers. Capital buffers of banks are positively associated with the increase in
uninsured deposits and total equity risk expressed in weekly standard deviation
of the stock prices.
The evidence on the shareholder discipline in emerging markets is restricted to
monitoring. Caprio and Honohan (2004) state that share of total banking assets
of the listed banks in emerging markets varies extensively. They provide evidence
that the probability for the existence of stock market discipline increases with the
increase in the share of total banking assets of the listed banks. However they do
not present evidence for the influencing ability of market participants. Bongini et
al. (2002) explore the performance of stock market prices, accounting data and
credit ratings in forecasting bank fragility for East Asian countries. They find
out that information content of stock prices and rating agencies is not superior
to the backward looking accounting information. They conclude that in less de-
veloped financial markets it is important for the supervisors to rely on different
assessments of financial fragility of the banks. Richards and Deddouche (1999) ex-
amine emerging markets bank stock returns around the announcements of rating
changes by rating agencies. They use data from the Emerging Market DataBase
of the International Finance Corporation. They find out that supervisors should
be cautious in using the information embedded in bank stock prices to monitor
the safety and soundness of the banking industry in emerging markets.
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4.3 Banking in Turkey
Turkish banking system consists of large state-owned commercial banks and pri-
vate banks. Since 1980, the share of state-owned banks declined in terms of the
assets while the private banks increased their share in total banking assets. One
main objective of the structural adjustment program that was initiated in 1980 was
the liberalization and integration of the financial system with the rest of the world.
Until 1980, the financial system was characterized by controls on capital flows, a
fixed exchange rate regime and restrictions on interest rates. The liberalization
program resulted in major changes in the balance sheets of banks until 1993. The
two big changes were the increases in the non-deposit sources of funding and the
share of foreign denominated assets and liabilities. The change in the composition
of assets and liabilities resulted in increased vulnerability to external shocks. Fur-
thermore, short-term deficit-financing policy of the government coupled with high
interest rate and low depreciation of the exchange rate policy encouraged banks
to change from lending to private businesses to purchasing government securities.
Most of the funding for purchases of government securities came from short term
loans obtained from foreign banks. The short positions of the banks continued
to increase while profits increased. By the end of 1993, the return on equity of
the banking industry was as high as 43%. However, the government reversed its
policy and adopted a low interest rate and low depreciation policy on the exchange
rate. This reversal of policy led to the financial crisis in 1994 that resulted in the
devaluation of the Turkish Lira (TL). As banks struggled to close their foreign
currency open positions, they suffered large losses. Consequently, three banks
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were liquidated and state-owned banks assets shrank substantially.
The recovery of the banking industry after the crisis in 1994 was short-lived.
After some remedial measures and the establishment of full deposit insurance
for deposits, government returned to the high interest low depreciation of the
exchange rate policy. A regulatory agency , Bank Regulation and Supervision
Agency (BRSA) was established in 2000. State banks continued extending loans
to the agricultural sector and the small and medium-sized enterprizes (SME) as a
result of continued political patronage. The losses of the state banks originating
from loans at below market rates and political favoritism were not completely
compensated by the Treasury. Attracted by high margins between the yield on
government securities and cost of borrowing abroad, private banks increased their
holdings of government securities, defying market risk and exchange rate risk.
Another problem with the private banks was the extent of related party lend-
ing. Most of the banks belonged to holding companies with businesses in diversified
industries as a result of rapid growth of some business groups. Although limits
existed on related party lending, banks often avoided restrictions by adopting a
reciprocity strategy. That was lending to related businesses of fellow bank own-
ers. The bank owners would return the favor by lending to the businesses of the
other bank owner. Owner-managers did not demonstrate prudence in evaluating
and monitoring the projects and credit risks of the group companies. During the
1990s, related party lending was a major problem of the industry. According to
BRSA, about 20% of total loans were made to related-businesses that would not
have otherwise qualified as a loan. Imprudent lending resulted in the group banks
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which ultimately resulted in their liquidation.
The period between the financial crisis in 1994 and the double dip financial
crisis of late 2000 and early 2001 was characterized by increased riskiness of the
banking industry. During this period state-owned banks were exposed to interest
rate risk while private banks were subject to credit and foreign exchange risk. The
banking system during the period was heavily influenced by the increasing bor-
rowing requirements of the government financed by domestic debt, policy reversals
by the central banks and the inability of the BRSA to resolve problem banks.
Prior to the crisis in 2001, banks operated in a high inflation environment
thus limiting their ability to borrow long-term domestically. Financing of asset
acquisition with increasingly shorter term liabilities became a structural charac-
teristic of the Turkish banking industry. State owned banks were accumulating
large non-performing loans while private banks were increasing their short-term
foreign exchange liabilities to finance purchase of high yielding government secu-
rities.1 Slow depreciation of the TL encouraged the banks to expand the practice
of increasing foreign currency liabilities.
In addition to short term financing of purchases of government securities through
overnight borrowing and repos, banks increasingly started using structured loan
agreements where government securities were used as collateral for borrowing
abroad. Particularly, one mid-sized bank, Demirbank was holding large amounts
of government securities. Increasing interest rates in November 2000 triggered
1During the period, Treasury was financing budget deficits with loans from state banks and
at the same time as the supervisor of banks allowing them to treat non-performing loans as
performing loans.
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large sell offs of government securities and Demirbank lost its ability to borrow
short term and subsequently taken over by the State Deposit Insurance Fund
(SDIF). This event marked the beginning of the financial crisis.
The number of banks in Turkey was 50 by the end of 2006, down from 81 in
2000. Banking industry consists of fourteen private banks, fifteen foreign banks,
thirteen investment and development banks, four participation banks, three state
banks and the SDIF bank. After 2003, the banks restructured their branches and
personnel in order to increase their market share especially in consumer loans and
loans to SMEs.
Weak institutional environment in the form of poor supervision first by the
Treasury then, by the BRSA the vulnerability of state banks to interest rate
increases, the vulnerability of private banks to exchange risks and the financing
of government debt by short term securities were all significant factors in the
development of poor banking practices in Turkey.
Due to the significant influence of the fiscal policy pursued by a succession of
governments in the 1990s banking industry operated in a financial environment
that was marked by dependence on high real returns on government securities
and risky lending. High public sector borrowing obscured monitoring efforts by
the shareholders. Further, extensive related party lending rendered any effective
monitoring by shareholders. Consequently, ownership structure of the banks lim-
ited market discipline. Owner-managers determined the extent of risk taking by
banks. Holding companies that owned banks benefitted from reduced borrowing
costs and increased lines of credits provided by their own banks. In addition,
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Turkish banking industry has some unique peculiarities. For example, majority of
the shares of the largest private bank, IsBank, is owned by a political party. The
objectives of the party may very well be different than that of a profit seeking
investor. Pension funds of employees also own a large portion of the shares of
IsBank. Ownership of shares by the employees’ pension fund is common practice
in Turkey.
4.4 Methodology and the Data
4.4.1 The Empirical Model
We estimate the responsiveness of shareholders to risk measures of banks and
their ability to influence management decisions on the risk variables of the bank.
Once shareholders observe increasing risks originating from the balance sheet of
the banks, they influence the management to reduce risks that may result in a loss
of wealth. This interaction between the shareholders and the bank management
is defined by Bliss and Flannery (2002) as market discipline demonstrating the
investors’ ability to evaluate the banks’ financial condition and the responsiveness
of the bank’s management to the investors’ risk assessment.
First, we expect that outside shareholders assess the riskiness of the publicly
traded banks based on the financial reports of the banks. Thus, shareholders’ bank
risk monitoring behavior exists if there is a significant relation between equity
market-based risk indicators and risk measures obtained from the balance sheet.
102
Second, we expect that shareholders’ assessment of risk is observed in the
volatility of rates of return to equity of banks. This volatility influences the risk-
taking behavior of the management. However, the influence of shareholders on
managerial actions is not obvious. To estimate the extent of influence of share-
holders on bank management, we regress return volatility of bank stocks on the
direction of the change in risk parameters from the balance sheet.
Three equity market-based risk indicators are used to estimate the extent of
shareholders’ monitoring of bank risks and influencing management action on risk.
The three risk indicators are (i) bank’s sensitivity to market returns (market
beta),2 (ii) standard deviation of the bank stock returns (total risk),3 and (iii)
bank’s sensitivity to unanticipated returns calculated as the standard deviation
of the error terms (idiosyncratic risk). Market beta is an indicator for systematic
risk and measures the risk of portfolio investors. Idiosyncratic risk is the risk of
unanticipated returns of the bank. Total risk is the weighted sum of systematic
and idiosyncratic risks.
Following Flannery and James (1984) and Kane and Unal (1988), we study
two-index model below to decompose the total risk of bank i’s returns:
rin = αi + βm rmn + βb rbn + ein (4.1)
2According to CAPM, βm = σim/σ2m where σim is the covariance between the return of asset
i and the return of the market portfolio. σ2m is the variance of the return of the market portfolio.
3σ(rin) is calculated using the daily price series in the related quarter adjusted for rights’
offerings, stock splits and dividend payments as follows: σ(rin) = {
∑N
n=1(rin − rˆi)2/(N − 1)}0.5
where rˆi is the average daily return for bank i and N is the number of trading days.
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where n = 1, . . . N and N is the number of trading days in each quarter. The
logarithmic return on equity for bank i is rin and the logarithmic return on the
market index on day n is rmn. The composite price index of the top 100 firms
by asset size traded in the Istanbul Stock Exchange, ISE 100 Index is used as the
market index. To represent the return on a debt instrument index, rb, we use daily
overnight lending rate. In the above specification for the return on equity, αi is
the bank-specific intercept, βm is the bank return’s sensitivity to market, βb is the
bank return sensitivity to overnight lending rate and ei is the error term for bank i.
4
Model I: Shareholders’ Bank Risk Monitoring Behavior
In the first model, we estimate the ability of the shareholders to monitor the
risks of the banks. Market-based risk indicators represent outside shareholders’
assessment of bank’s risk taking behavior. The changes in market prices allow
shareholders to observe the market’s valuation of the bank. Shareholders’ moni-
toring behavior can be established if there is a significant relation between equity
market-based risk indicators and the bank specific risk factors. The risk factors
are ratios obtained from the financial statements of the bank. This hypothesis is
analyzed using the following model:
Yit = αi + φYit−1 +
5∑
j=1
γjBank Riskijt +
4∑
k=1
θkXikt + ψZt + eit (4.2)
4We separately estimated a single index model where rin = αi+βm rmn+ein. The estimated
βm was slightly lower. However, since interest rate is a significant factor in determining bank
risk, as argued by many authors we included in in the decomposition of return risk.
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where eit is the error term. Yit represents each one of the three market-based risk
indicators: market beta, total and idiosyncratic risks for bank i at t. The variable
Bank Risk represents the CAMEL ratios obtained from the financial statements of
the banks: capitalization (capital-to-assets), asset quality (non-performing loans-
to-assets), managerial performance (operational efficiency),5 earnings, (Net profit
after tax-to-assets (Return on assets)) and liquidity (liquid assets-to-assets). All
of the bank specific risk factors are introduced without a lag in order to account
for the contemporaneous relationship between the market-based indicators and
the bank risk variables (Flannery, 1998; Gilbert, 1990; Berger, 1991; Bliss and
Flannery, 2002).
Bank capitalization, liquidity and operational efficiency are expected to have a
negative relation with the equity market-based indicators implying declining risk.
An increase in the non-performing loans-to-asset ratio indicates high risk for a
bank. Since risk is positively related to return, the profitability of the bank would
be positively related to equity market-based risk indicators.
In equation 4.2, we have two sets of control variables. Xik denotes control vari-
ables that are related to other bank characteristics that might affect the volatility
of bank stocks. These are bank size (Assets (in logs)), the leverage ratio (Total
deposits-to-assets), franchise value (Market-to-book value) and the trading volume
of the banking firm in the capital market (Total trading volume (in logs)).
As the increase in bank size and deposits-to-assets ratio increase asset risk, we
5Operational efficiency scores are calculated using a Cobb-Douglass frontier (Batesse and
Coelli, 1995). The value of scores range from 0 to one. The estimated scores show the efficiency
in providing loans for given deposits and labor force.
105
expect that both variables have a positive effect on the market beta. Increases in
the bank franchise value results in a decline in the risk indicators. The effect of an
increase in trading volume in the stock market would be to increase market-based
risks. Increases in bank size and the relative size of insured deposits shift part
of the bank risk to the deposit insurance agency. Consequently, we expect that
other two market-based risk indicators, total risk and idiosyncratic risk to have a
negative relation with bank size and the leverage ratio.
Changes in the macroeconomic conditions (Z) that might affect the capital
market are incorporated as quarterly changes in the current gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP Growth). It is hypothesized that increase in gross domestic product
lowers the volatility of the returns of the banking firms.
Model II: Shareholders’ Influence on Management
Shareholders expect management action to correct disproportionate risk tak-
ing. Shareholders’ influence on bank management exists if rational managers be-
come aware of changes in the risk indicators and take action to decrease bank risk.
Therefore, in the second model, one would expect the bank risk to decrease in the
periods following an increase in risk measured by one of the three risk indicator.
Table 4.1 demonstrates the expected response of the bank management to
risk indicators. Management reaction to increases in risk indicators can be ob-
served in terms of increases in the capital asset and liquidity ratios and a decrease
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Table 4.1: Management Response to Risk
∆(K/A) > 0 ∆(LA/A) > 0 ∆(NPL/A) < 0
Market Beta (β) + + -
Total Risk (σ) + + -
Idiosyncratic Risk (σε) + + -
∆ denotes change over time. K/A is capital-to-asset ratio, LA/A is liquid asset-to-asset
ratio and NPL/A is non-performing loans-to-asset ratio.
in non-performing loans ratio as shown in Table 4.1. However, there would be
a difference in the magnitude of response of by different types of management.
For example, owner-managers would react to changes in total risk more than to
changes in the market risk, βm. Managements response to idiosyncratic risk would
also be stronger than to market risk. Market risk would be a limited risk indicator
particularly if the bank has to operate in a high risk financial environment.
Berger (1991) argues that since managers’ absence of risky actions cannot be
observed, it is not easy to measure influence using capital market information.
However, Bliss and Flannery (2002) find limited evidence of market influence
where return volatility prompts managerial action to increase market value of the
bank. To estimate the influence of the shareholders on management, we model the
average effect of the market based risk indicators on the the change in bank risk
factors. The following logit model is used to estimate the extent of the influence of
shareholders’ risk indicators on decisions about the composition of balance sheet.
Influenceit = αi + φ Yi,t−1 +
2∑
j=1
θjXijt + ψZt + eit (4.3)
where eit is the error term. Infleuenceit is a binary variable that equals one
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if bank i decreased its risk (i.e., reduces non-performing loans-to-assets ratio, or
increases capital-to-assets and liquid assets-to-assets ratios); and zero if bank i
increased its risk (i.e., increases non-performing loans-to-asset ratio, or decreases
the capital ratio and the liquidity ratio). Infleuenceit measures whether a proper
management action is taken or not.
Yit denotes the market-based risk indicators: market beta, total risk and id-
iosyncratic risk. Yit is included in the equation with a one quarter lag to account
for the time needed for the managerial response. We hypothesize that increases in
the market-based risk indicators increase the probability of managers’ response so
that management decisions result in decreases in the bank specific risks or moral
hazard.
In equation 4.3, control variables (Xij) are bank size (Assets (in logs)) and
franchise value of the bank (Market-to-book value). Although we have no a priori
expectation about the relation between the variable Infleuenceit and the size of
the bank, increases in bank franchise value is expected to reduce moral hazard.
(Z) is a dummy variable for the time period when the newly established banking
regulatory agency, the Bank Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA) is op-
erational. The dummy variable BRSA Dummy is zero from the beginning of the
estimation period until the fourth quarter of 2000. It takes a value of one starting
in fourth quarter of 2000 until the third quarter of 2006. The incorporation of
the BRSA Dummy is to control the changes in the bank management after the
introduction of the BRSA.
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4.4.2 Data
We use quarterly data over the period 1997 and 2006. Bank financial statements
for each bank are obtained from the Turkish Bankers’ Association. Number of
sample banks vary. Initially, there were 12 publicly-traded deposit banks in the
data set. During the sample period five new bank shares have started to be traded
in ISE. Also, during the sample period considered, four banks were closed by the
deposit insurance agency. Therefore, the data set is an unbalanced panel of 10 to
16 banks.6 All bank data from financial statements are transformed into dollars
because of the high depreciation in the value of TL until 2005.
Macroeconomic data are obtained from the Central Bank of Turkey. Daily
bank equity prices and the ISE 100 Index are obtained from DataStream. All
price data are adjusted for rights’ offerings, stock splits and dividend payments.
In Table 4.2, we report the percent of traded shares of sample banks, their
share in the ISE trading volume, initial public offering dates, type of management
and the date of change in management. Until 2005, owner-managers were domi-
nant in the management of publicly-traded banks. As foreign ownership in banks
increased, professionals managing the banks also increased. By the end of 2006,
7 of the publicly traded banks out of 16 managed by professional management
teams.
Table 4.3 presents the quarterly summary statistics of the variables for the
period 1997:4 to 2006:3. The sample period includes the high volatility period 1997
6There are 33 deposit banks in Turkey as of December 2006.
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Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics (1997:4-2006:3)
Standard
Mean Deviation Min Max
Market Based Risk Indicators
Market Risk (β) 0.9609 0.3634 -0.2647 1.9005
Total Risk (σ) 0.4131 0.1510 0.1215 1.0859
Idiosyncratic Risk (σε) 0.2979 0.1351 0.0904 1.0883
Bank Risk Variables
Non-performing Loans/Assets 0.0088 0.0209 -0.1717 0.1541
Capital/Assets 0.0757 0.2679 -3.2041 0.3716
Operational Efficiency 0.5452 0.2572 0.0006 0.9998
Return on Assets -0.0014 0.1762 -1.7574 0.2670
Liquid Assets/Assets 0.2442 0.1647 0.0000 0.7973
Control Variables
Assets (in logs) 21.8725 1.2217 18.4405 24.6087
Market-to-Book Value 1.8692 1.8128 0.2400 21.0100
Total Deposits/Assets 0.6613 0.2597 0.2991 3.5901
Total Trading Volume (in logs) 11.9076 1.9675 5.6426 16.0815
GDP Growth 0.0402 0.0620 -0.1030 0.1440
to 2001 and the post crisis after 2001 characterized as a period of continued growth
and consolidation in banking. State Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF) took over the
management of 4 banks out of a total of 16 publicly-traded banks (Table 4.2).
The average value of market beta for banks is 0.96 implying that banks have a
return risk close to the market average. The closeness of the banks’ beta to one is
due to the dominance of bank share in the ISE. Trading in bank shares constitute
about 32% of the trading volume in ISE.
The average return on assets is a small negative. This is due to the large
losses incurred by the banking industry during the crisis at the end of 2000 which
lasted until February 2001. Banks’ average score for operational efficiency is low
compared to U.S. and the European banks. However, efficiency score improved
over time. While the average levels of all the variables are reasonable, variation
111
among banks remains high.
4.5 Empirical Results
4.5.1 Monitoring
Table 4.4 presents fixed effects estimation of the monitoring model (Model I) de-
scribed in equation 4.2 using market beta (systematic risk), total risk and idiosyn-
cratic risk as dependent variables. Each one of the risk indicators is regressed
on bank risk variables obtained using balance sheet information, bank specific
control variables and the indicator of general economic conditions. The first two
columns contain market beta results, columns 3-4 presents the results for total
risk. Columns 5-6 represent the estimated parameters of the model using the
idiosyncratic risk. Examining the estimated coefficients across the columns, one
observes that the results for systematic risk are different than the results for the
other two market-based risk indicators. This implies robust identification of dif-
ferent perception of risk by different shareholders of banks.
Similar to other industries, monitoring of the financial conditions of the banks
is costly. Hence, the most extensive monitoring is likely to be done by those
who benefit the most from the bank’s good performance, i.e., stockholders with
significant ownership positions. The CAPM predicts that investors in high market
beta shares seek compensation for risk by a high rate of return. However, for
managers or inside shareholders, it is the total risk that matters since they are
112
committed and unable to offset it by diversification (Davis and Pointon, 1984).
Recently, Baele, De Jonghe and Vennet (2007) provide evidence that diversified
investors such as investment or pension funds are primarily interested in systematic
risk exposures but not the non-systematic risk. Saunders, Strock and Travlos
(1990) and Sullivan and Spong (2007) emphasized that interest in monitoring
management and the bank’s operations are influenced according to the proportions
of their wealth concentrated in the bank’s equity.
We evaluate monitoring behavior by shareholders according to the evidence of
significant relation between financial conditions of a bank and non-systematic risks
(idiosyncratic and total risks) of the bank. First, we find that there is a significant
and positive relation between non-performing loans and the market beta implying
risk taking incentives of the diversified shareholders (columns 1-2). Banks with
higher non-performing loans are perceived more risky by outside shareholders but
not by inside shareholders. Anecdotal evidence suggests that particularly interna-
tional institutional investors monitoring of the non-performing loans.7 A positive
coefficient for return on assets (ROA) also indicates that diversified investors as-
sessment of risk is consistent with higher returns. A positive relation between the
market beta and the ROA implies an increase in systematic risk as profitability
increases. A diversified investor would consider this as a signal for further diver-
sification while owner-managers would not consider it as an important factor of
risk. The increase in risk may be due to an increase in the general riskiness of the
market. Owner-managers would not consider it as significant because they may
7We would like to thank Hasan Ersel for pointing out this fact.
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hedge any increased risk-taking which may be unknown to outsiders.
Owner-managers or large shareholders monitor the fundamental ratios of the
bank. In particular, increases in capital-asset ratio, liquidity ratio, and opera-
tional efficiency significantly lower the total risk. Thus, reductions in default and
liquidity risk reduces the risk perception of the owner-managers and large share-
holders. In addition, improved efficiency is an indication of lower risk for them
because they anticipate better earnings in the future (columns 3-4).
In columns 5 and 6, increasing capital ratio significantly reduces the idiosyn-
cratic risk of a bank. No other bank risk variable is significant. Higher capital-
ization provides a cushion for unexpected changes so, as expected, idiosyncratic
risks declines significantly with higher capital ratio.
The estimated coefficients of control variables and the three risk indicators
provide evidence of different behavior of different types of shareholders. Coeffi-
cients of control variables used in the market beta equations are different than
the ones for total and idiosyncratic risk. First, increasing bank size and leverage
(higher deposits-to-assets ratio) is significantly and positively related to market
beta but negatively related to total and idiosyncratic risks. This is expected since
large banks are able to diversify their asset risks better than the small banks.
Moreover, investors believe that implicit failure guarantees are positively related
to bank size. The negative relationship between size and the bank specific risk
(column 5-6) is consistent with the findings of Demsetz and Strahan (1997), Pe-
nas and Unal (2004), Stiroh, (2006) and Baele et al. (2007). The idiosyncratic
risk of banks is perceived to be insignificant when the bank is considered to be
116
“too-big-to-fail”.
Franchise value disciplines the risk taking associated with moral hazard by
increasing the costs of financial distress. We find total risk is negatively related
to franchise value of the bank as expected. Since well-diversified investors have
limited commitment to the bank, increasing franchise value has no significant effect
on the market beta. For wealth maximizing owner-managers market-to-book value
is significant. Any improvements in the management of the company increases the
market value of the bank which reduces the total risk of the owners.
We find that stocks of banks with higher trading volume have significantly
higher volatility. However, this is only significant for the beta coefficient. Since
most of the trading activity is done by outside shareholders, periods of high trading
results in bigger fluctuations in stock prices. Finally, economic growth has no effect
on the market beta, total and idiosyncratic risk.
4.5.2 Influence
As emphasized by Bliss and Flannery (2002) shareholders must be able to influence
the risk-taking behavior by banks in order to exercise market discipline. Further
the shareholders would have to use market information in order to influence the
bank management. Hence, we estimate the market influence model (Model II)
in equation 4.3 using a logistic regression. Any influence on the management
should come primarily from the owner-managers and the large shareholders. The
influence would manifest itself in the changes in some major financial ratios. We
117
estimate three equations where the dependent variables are the probability of a
change in capital ratio, liquidity ratio and the non-performing loans-to-assets ratio.
These are the three key ratios that the management would try to improve based
on increased market risk after controlling for other factors.
In Table 4.5, we present the regression results. In all three dependent variables,
we find that total risk and idiosyncratic risk have the right sign. As expected, we
find that periods of increased total return risk and idiosyncratic risk are followed by
increased probability of improvements in the capital and liquidity ratios as well as
reduction in the non-performing loans-to-assets ratio by owner-managers. These
effects are significantly observed in non-performing loans to assets and capital to
assets estimations. Risk measures have no impact on the liquidity ratio. Although
one would expect the bank management to increase liquidity when faced with
increased risk, all coefficients in the liquidity equations are insignificant. This
due to the costs associated in increasing liquidity which means accepting steep
discounts on changing the asset composition from illiquid assets to liquid assets.
Managers are not willing to accept losses in order to increase liquidity.
These findings suggest that an increase in the probability of improvement in
the financial structure of the bank due to increased volatility is an indication
of the disciplinary role of shareholders and imply the existence of influence on
the management by owner-managers and large shareholders. Beta has the right
sign for the capital ratio and the non-performing loans-to-asset ratio but it is
not significant. So, it can be argued that portfolio investors do not exercise any
significant control over management.
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We find that large banks significantly lower capital-to-assets ratio. However,
non-performing loans-to-asset ratio increases with asset size. Franchise value mea-
sured as the ratio of market to book value is not a significant factor in influenc-
ing bank management decisions. Further, the establishment of BRSA increases
capital-to-asset ratio due to the additional capital requirements set by the newly
established regulatory authority.
4.6 Conclusion
We tested for existence of market discipline of banks by different types of share-
holders. Shareholder discipline manifests itself in the form of monitoring the risk-
iness of banks as well as influencing the management actions of the banks to limit
risk-taking.
Shareholders monitor banks’ risk-taking behavior by observing key financial
ratios. We do see a difference in the way shareholders perceive the sources of risk
for banks. Diversified shareholders who own shares of banks a part of a large
portfolio are primarily interested on high profits. However, for owner-managers
capital ratio liquidity and efficiency are important factors determining the level
of risk of the banks. While market value over the book value is important for
owner-managers, diversified shareholders are primarily interested in return. So,
owner-managers demonstrate closer monitoring of banks.
Similarly, owner-managers have some influence on the management to take
action in order to reduce risks. The probability of improving key financial ratios,
120
taken as sign of management response, increases as the total risk increases. To-
tal risk is the most important risk indicator that triggers a management action.
However, the influence of owner-managers is observed in small banks. Manage-
ment of small banks takes measures to increase capital ratio while reducing the
share of non-performing loans in assets as a result of increased risk assessment of
shareholders.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
After the crisis in the Russian Federation in 1998 and the crisis in Turkey in
2001, Central Bank of Russia and Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency of
Turkey restructured the banking industries in both of the countries according to
the requirements of Basel II. Market discipline, the third pillar of Basel II, could
be used as a complementary mechanism in supervising banks in both countries.
In this thesis, the extent of market discipline in the Russian Federation and in
Turkey is studied.
In the first essay, depositors’ monitoring of bank risk taking in the Russian
Federation is measured. After the banking crisis, Central Bank of Russia has
consolidated and improved the role of banks in financial intermediation. A new
banking law was introduced with the intent of improving the prudential require-
ments for banks in line with Basel II principles. In the meanwhile, depositors
became aware of banks’ risk taking behavior. Findings support that depositors
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shift their funds in the banks based on the banks’ liquidity and capital adequacy.
On the other hand, risk factors are not significant in demanding higher inter-
est rates on deposits. It is also observed that the establishment of the deposit
insurance system has not yet been effective in determining depositor behavior.
In the second essay, depositor discipline of banks in the Russian Federation
and in Turkey is compared. In the Russian Federation depositors suffered because
of the large losses after the crisis in 1998 while in Turkey depositors as well as
other creditors were fully protected from incurring in during the banking crisis in
2001. Altering institutional and macroeconomic factors affect the extent of depos-
itor discipline in two countries. Evidence in quantity discipline by the depositors
is presented both in the Russian Federation and in Turkey. The significant fac-
tors that determine the change in the flow of deposits are the capital adequacy,
liquidity and asset quality of banks. However, in their assessment of liquidity, de-
positors demonstrate different behavior in Russian Federation and Turkey. While
depositors increase funds in liquid banks in the Russian Federation, liquidity is not
perceived as low risk in Turkey because banks may be funding liquid assets with
international funds which includes exchange rate risk. On the other hand, there is
no evidence of price discipline by depositors on banks in the Russian Federation.
In Turkey, limited price discipline is observed on banks that increase the share of
loans portfolio in assets. Furthermore, the relation between bank efficiency and
market discipline is evident only in the Russian Federation. Depositors are willing
to accept lower interest income by placing in more efficient banks. Less efficient
banks try to pay lower interest rates by taking the advantage of growth.
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In the third essay, existence of market discipline of Turkish banks by different
types of shareholders is studied. Shareholders monitor banks’ risk-taking behavior
by observing key financial ratios. A difference is observed in the way shareholders
perceive the sources of risk for banks. Diversified shareholders who own shares of
banks a part of a large portfolio are primarily interested on high profits. However,
for owner-managers capital ratio liquidity and efficiency are important factors
determining the level of risk of the banks. While market value over the book value
is important for owner-managers, diversified shareholders are primarily interested
in return. So, owner-managers demonstrate closer monitoring of banks.
Similarly, owner-managers have some influence on the management to take
action in order to reduce risks. The probability of improving key financial ratios,
taken as sign of management response, increases as the total risk increases. To-
tal risk is the most important risk indicator that triggers a management action.
However, the influence of owner-managers is observed in small banks. Manage-
ment of small banks takes measures to increase capital ratio while reducing the
share of nonperforming loans in assets as a result of increased risk assessment of
shareholders.
Overall, findings support that market discipline exists in the Russian Federa-
tion and Turkey. Altering institutional characteristics of banking, macroeconomic
factors, features of market participants and the instruments affect the extent of
market discipline in two countries. Because of the limited number of debt instru-
ments in the Russian Federation, only depositor discipline is studied. During the
analysis period Russian depositors impose quantity discipline. Moreover, because
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of the short time elapsed, only partial the effects of the deposit insurance are ob-
served. Financial system and banking industry in Turkey is more developed than
its counterparts in the Russian Federation. Therefore, both depositor discipline
and outside equityholder discipline could be studied. In Turkey, depositors im-
pose both quantity and price discipline only after the full deposit insurance in the
post-crisis period. Before that, Turkish depositors are not interested in monitoring
bank risks. There is also evidence in favor of owner-managers’ monitoring of bank
risks and the ability to influence management in Turkey.
In contrast to the opinions about the ineffectiveness of market discipline in
emerging economies, our findings support Levy-Yeyati and Martinez Peria (2004)
and Caprio and Honohan (2004). Controlling macroeconomic characteristics and
institutional features, we find out that there are evidence in favor of depositor and
equityholder discipline in the Russian Federation and Turkey.
Monitoring and influencing ability of the stakeholders in the Russian Feder-
ation and in Turkey can be studied further. For example, analysis is needed
on regional banks in the Russian Federation as well as the competition between
intra-group banks and diversified independent banks. Moreover, for both coun-
tries, deposit data used in this thesis is not categorized according to the size of
deposits. More detailed data would provide results depending on the size of the
investments and the effect of deposit insurance on each category. Furthermore,
both of the countries are experiencing increase in share of foreign banks. Foreign
bank participation and its reflection on market discipline would be another area of
research. Finally, more sophisticated models could develop the analysis on outside
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equityholders’ monitoring behavior.
The findings of this thesis on the extent of market discipline in the Russian
Federation and Turkey has several implications for the regulatory and supervisory
authorities of both of the countries. First, both of the countries are in the process
of adopting Basel II into their own regulation and supervision procedures. Al-
though the will to increase market discipline appears in the mission statements,
most of the effort is spent on risk management procedures. Using market disci-
pline as a supplement to regulatory supervision should be included in the agenda
of the authorities. Secondly, the regulatory and supervisory authorities of both of
the countries mention about enhanced transparency. However market discipline is
more than information disclosure which is only one of the pre-requisites of market
discipline among the others. Effort should increase in improving the efficiency of
the markets. Additionally, the uninformed stakeholders should be supported to
acquire the necessary skills to interpret the information emitted to the markets.
Thirdly, the number of stakeholders to monitor the banks in both of the countries
should be increased. In the Russian Federation, IPOs for the banks should be
encouraged. Furthermore, in both of the countries, uninsured large debtholders
should be given incentives to monitor the banks, closely. CD and SND markets
should be developed. Finally, although both of the countries have reasonable de-
posit insurance schemes, other implicit guarantees such as the state ownership of
banks should be abandoned.
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APPENDIX A
STOCHASTIC FRONTIERS
We use the stochastic frontier production function proposed in Battesse and Coelli
(1992) where firm effects are assumed to be distributed truncated normal random
variables, which are also permitted to vary systematically with time. The output
is defined as the volume of loans and the inputs are capital, labor and deposits at
banks.
The model is estimated by maximizing a likelihood function. The model may
be expressed as:
Yit = xitβ + (Vit − Uit), i = 1, . . . N, t = 1, . . . T
where Yit is (the logarithm of) the production of the i-th firm in the t-th time
period; xit is a vector of (transformations of the) input quantities of the i-th
firm in the t-th time period; β is regression coefficient; Vit are random variables
which are assumed to be identically independently distributed (iid) N(0, σ2V ), and
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independent of the
Uit = Ui exp(−η(t− T )),
where Ui are non-negative random variables which are assumed to account for
technical inefficiency in production and are assumed to be iid as truncations at
zero of the N(µ, σ2U) distribution; η is a coefficient to be estimated; and the panel
of data need not be complete (i.e. unbalanced panel data).
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APPENDIX B
FINANCIAL SYSTEM IN TURKEY
In Table B.1, we present the size and composition of the financial system in Turkey
by the end of 2006. There were 50 banks, which dominate the financial system
in Turkey: fourteen private banks, fifteen foreign banks, thirteen investment and
development banks, four participation banks, and three state banks. The remain-
ing bank belonged to the State Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF). Number of banks
dropped from 80 to 50 during 1999-2006. After 2003, the banks invested in new
branches and personnel in order to increase their market share especially in con-
sumers loans and loans to small and medium (SME) size firms. Banking assets
accounted for 86.7 percent of GDP. Low level of banking assets to GDP ratio was
perceived as a signal for the growth potential of the industry. The second largest
financial intermediary was Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE). Market capitalization
was around $162.4 million and the ratio of market capitalization to GDP was cal-
culated to be 40.1 percent. Assets of the other institutions in the financial system
formed only 11.1 percent of GDP and play a minor role.
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Table B.1: Turkish Financial System (by end of 2006)
Turkish financial system size and composition is presented. The number of financial institutions
resides in the first column. Assets of the financial institutions are found in the second column.
Percentage distribution of assets of the financial system is provided in the third and the forth
columns where Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) market capitalization is included in the former
column, and excluded in the other. The last column is for the asset to GDP ratio of the financial
institutions.
% Distribution Assets/
No of Assets ISE GDP
Institutions (billion $) (Inc.) (Excl.) (%)
GDP 407.5
Banks 50 353.8 62.9 88.5 86.7
ISE Market Capitalization - 162.4 29.0 - 40.1
Central Bank (CBRT) - 73.9 - - 18.1
Securities Investment Funds 285 15.6 2.7 3.9 3.8
Insurance Companies 35 7.3 1.3 1.8 1.7
Financial Leasing Companies 81 7,1 1.3 1.8 1.7
Pension Companies 11 5.0 0.9 1.3 1.2
Factoring Companies 86 4.5 0.8 1.1 1.1
Others 156 6.6 1.1 1.6 1.6
Total 704 636.2 100 100 156
Source: Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA), Istanbul Stock Exchange
(ISE), Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT), The Association of Capital Market
Intermediary Institutions of Turkey.
In Table B.2, we present the aggregate measures of Turkish banking industry
for 2005 and 2006. Since 2001 the composition of assets of banks changed. While
banks in Turkey increased loans, the share of marketable government securities
decreased. Banks started to increase intermediation activity after 2001 crisis.
Although banks lent to both companies and individuals, according to BRSA, the
consumer loans were growing faster than any other loan category. So, the banks
invested in consumer banking by opening new branches, increasing the number
of employees and expanding the volume of consumer credits such as credit cards,
mortgage and car loans. Deposits, which were about 61 percent of the bank
liabilities during 2005-2006, continued to be the main funding source of the loans.
However, especially after 2005, banks were interested in alternative funding sources
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Table B.2: Recent Aggregates of Turkish Banking Industry
The aggregate measures for Turkish banking industry in 2005 and 2006 are presented. Volume
of the important accounts of the aggregate balance sheet and their share in total assets are
provided for each year. Deposits to loans ratio is also given.
2005 2006
% Share in % Share in
Volume∗ Assets Volume∗ in Assets
Assets
Cash and Money Market Transactions 46.8 11.8 62.9 12.6
Marketable Securities 142.9 36 158.9 31.8
Loans 149.9 37.8 219 43.8
Other 57.4 14.4 58.9 11.8
Liabilities
Deposits 243.1 61.2 307.6 61.6
Other Debts 100.2 25.2 132.6 26.5
Capital 53.7 13.6 59.5 11.9
Total 397 100 499.7 100
Deposits/Loans - 162.2 - 140.5
Source: BRSA Monthly Bulletin. ∗: Billion TL
and the ratio of deposits to loans decrease. This can be attributed to a several
of reasons. First, both Turkish economy and the banking industry recovered.
Imports and exports expanded. Consequently, banks were able to increase trade
credits. Secondly, increase in consumer loans facilitated securitizations. Thirdly,
risk management requirements of BRSA accelerated the pace of the investment
activities of Turkish banks in risk management techniques. Banks were encouraged
to disclose information about their financial statements. So, 36 out of 50 banks
got rating from international rating agencies. By December 2006, the assets of the
rated banks in Turkey accounted for 97.5 percent of the assets of banking industry.
So, Turkish banks were able to borrow funds from international banks easily.
Market shares of the banks in Turkey according to function and ownership
structure are given in Panel A and Panel B of Table B.3, respectively. In Turkey,
deposit banks are permitted to collect deposits and borrow external funds in order
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to provide loans. However, investment and development banks can only borrow
external funds or use their own capital to give credits. Moreover, participation
banks make transactions according to different regulations. Therefore, we differ-
entiate banks according to their functions. As presented in Panel A, the subgroup
of deposit banks had the largest market share in Turkish banking industry, by
the end of 2006. Their assets formed 94.2 percent of the industry and they pro-
vided 92.5 percent of the loans while collecting 96.4 percent of the deposits. These
banks were able to borrow funds amounting to $22.3 billion from foreign financial
institutions. Amongst the three functional subgroups participation banks had the
lowest capital adequacy ratio. Consequently, they could not borrow international
funds.
In Panel B, we analyze banks according to their ownership structure. Domestic
private banks dominate the banking industry in Turkey, by the end of 2006. They
provided 60 percent of the loans and collected 53.2 percent of the deposits. Private
and foreign banks were not permitted to collect funds of the state enterprises.
Therefore, deposits market shares of private and foreign banks were slightly lower
than their shares in the loan market. Consequently, deposit market share of state
banks was relatively higher than their loan market share. After the crisis in
2001, the capital structures of state banks were strengthened. Turkish government
injected funds to compensate for the non-performing loan and miscellaneous losses.
So, in Panel B, we observe that state banks had the highest capital adequacy ratio.
Assets of the foreign banks formed 13.1 percent of the assets of banking in-
dustry. In addition to these assets, foreign investors had minority shares in listed
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private and state banks. According to capital markets regulations; investors hav-
ing minority shares have to be kept ISE Settlement and Custody Bank and regis-
tered to Central Registry Agency. In total, BRSA disclosed foreign ownership of
Turkish banks to be 35.9 percent, by the end of 2006.
Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) was one of the attractive emerging capital mar-
kets during last few years. In Table B.4, we present important statistics of ISE
and some other emerging capital markets. In 2005, the return on ISE 100 Index
was the second highest among the selected capital market indices. However, in
2006, ISE 100 Index was the second worst index after Thailand Stock Exchange
Index. Volatility in almost all of the emerging markets increased in May and June
2006 because of the global fear that FED would increase the interest rates further
to stop the increase in US inflation. ISE was one of the most affected exchanges
in emerging economies because timing of the global volatility coincided with the
terrorist attack to the Council of State had ended with the death of one of the
judges. Consequently, sales in ISE lowered the returns in 2006.
Stock market capitalization to GNP ratio is regarded as the merit that shows
the importance of the capital markets in the economy. Both in 2005 and 2006
capital markets in South Africa and Malaysia had the first and second highest
stock market capitalization to GNP ratio implying the development of the capital
markets. On the other hand, stock market capitalization to GNP ratio for ISE in
2006, decreased to 41 percent which was relatively low among the selected capital
markets in Table B.4. There may be several reasons for the low stock market
capitalization to GNP. First, there are very little incentives for the companies to
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go to public. Companies either borrow from banks or sell shares to private equity
funds rather than IPOs. So, number of new entries to ISE is very low (ie. It is 9 and
15 in 2005 and 2006 respectively.). Secondly, stock market capitalization in 2006
slightly rose to $162.4 billion from $161.6 billion in 2005 because of the negative
return of ISE. Thirdly, although ISE had lost value, the economy continued to
grow in 2006. So stock market capitalization to GNP ratio declined. Authorities
and private sector initiative are seeking means to improve the incentives for IPOs
in order to increase the importance of ISE in Turkish economy. In the last two
columns of Table B.4, we present the total value of share trading and turnover
velocity of the domestic shares. These merits indicate the depth and the liquidity
of the capital markets. Total value of share trading was relatively high for ISE.
Also, Turkey ranked second in 2005 and 2006 according to turnover velocity of the
domestic shares implying that ISE is one of the most liquid emerging markets.
Performance of ISE is traced by several indices. ISE-All Shares Index includes
all of the listed banks. According to total value of share trading and market
capitalization ISE-100, ISE-50 and ISE-30 indices that include the largest 100, 50
and 30 listed companies, are generated for professional investment purposes. There
are also sectoral indices in ISE-All Shares Index. These are financial, industrial,
service and technology indices.
In Figure B-1, we present the level of ISE-100 Index and National Financial
Institutions’ Index during 2002-2006. In 2006, thirteen out of the fifteen banks
traded were included in ISE-100, which was 10,370 in 2002. It had risen up to
39,117 in 2006 implying 277.2 percent increase in five years. National Financial
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Figure B-1: ISE Indices (1997:4-2006:3)
Institutions’ Index is the most important sectoral index in ISE and its weight ISE-
All Shares Index is 54.38 percent. It was 12,902 in 2002 and grew up to 60,168 in
2006. During 2002-2006, its return is 366.3 percent and it was superior to the re-
turn on ISE-100. National Financial Institutions’ Index is composed of companies
operating in the finance industry. By the end of 2006, banks and holding compa-
nies formed 71.25 percent and 21.45 percent of the index, respectively. Insurance,
leasing, factoring companies and real estate investment trusts accounted for the
remaining 7.3 percent. In 2006, the ratio of financial institutions’ stock market
capitalization to total market capitalization was 52.5 percent. Shares of financial
institutions were also the most traded shares in ISE. The ratio of total value of
share trading of financial institutions to total value of share trading in ISE is 56.1
percent.
Banking is the most important sub-sector in financial institutions sector. It
constituted 36.2 percent of stock market capitalization and 33.7 percent (around
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$75 billion) of total value of share trading in ISE, by the end of 2006. There were
fifteen listed banks. Two of them were investment and development banks and
twelve of them were deposit banks. The remaining bank was a participation bank.
Eight out of fifteen banks traded in ISE were amongst the first 25 companies with
highest market capitalization and seven of them were also classified amongst the
top 25 companies that have the highest total value of share trading.
Foreign investors were attracted to the financial sector. Share trade of financial
sector formed 70.8 percent of the value of the transactions by foreign investors. In
particular foreign investors were interested in the purchase and sales of the bank
shares. Accordingly, value of the bank shares trading reached to 52.1 percent of
the foreign investors’ trade in 2006.
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